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ABSTRACT
“A CONSTANT SURVEILLANCE”: THE NEW YORK STATE POLICE AND
THE STUDENT PEACE MOVEMENT, 1965-1973
MAY 2021
SETH KERSHNER, B.A., MASSACHUSETTS COLLEGE OF LIBERAL ARTS
M.S.L.S., SIMMONS UNIVERSITY
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Christian Appy

Historians recognize that there was an increase in political repression in the United States during
the Vietnam War era. While a number of accounts portray the Federal Bureau of Investigation
as the primary driver of repression for many groups and individuals during the 1960s and 1970s,
particularly those on the left, historians typically overlook the role played by local and state law
enforcement in political intelligence-gathering. This thesis seeks to advance the study of one
aspect of this much larger topic by looking at New York State Police surveillance of the
Vietnam-era student peace movement. Drawing extensively on State Police spy files housed at
the New York State Archives, the thesis makes several significant contributions to the existing
historiography on this period. First, it demonstrates how state and local police contributed to the
climate of political repression and surveillance during the Vietnam era. Second, while this thesis
encompasses state police surveillance at all types of institutions, including elite private
universities and second-tier state colleges, in doing so it provides the first-ever detailed look at
how community college students organized against the war. Since a majority of community
college students were from relatively low-income backgrounds, chronicling the history of protest
on two-year campuses gives historians another angle from which to counter the persistent myth
that antiwar activism failed to penetrate the most working-class sectors of U.S. society.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
On April 23, 1969, a detective in the Hudson River city of Kingston informed colleagues at the
New York State Police (NYSP) of a new peace group at Ulster County Community College.
The detective was himself a part-time student at the college and had long served as a liaison
between Kingston’s police department and NYSP’s countersubversive detail, formally known as
Special Services. He was happy to provide a sampling of the group’s antiwar flyers and pledged
to assist State Police in monitoring the group’s activities. Within days, Special Services
investigators were on the phone with a dean to learn more about the college’s Ad Hoc
Committee to End the War in Vietnam. Finding the dean uncooperative, on April 25, Special
Services sent one of its plainclothes investigators to cover the committee’s first open meeting,
held on the steps of the college library.
Mingling among approximately 60 students at the meeting, the undercover agent
recorded the names those who appeared to be most heavily involved in antiwar work. Of
particular interest to the investigator was the committee’s faculty advisor, a UCCC economics
professor who addressed students on the need to bring “pressure to bear on the administration to
stop the war in Vietnam” and to “bring the boys home.” A student newspaper article on the
professor’s political advocacy was subsequently clipped and added to the intelligence files at the
NYSP’s Troop F headquarters 40 miles away in Middletown.1
For two hours, as the investigator took notes and wrote the names of students who
volunteered for various subcommittees, he apparently made little attempt to conceal his work.
But as the meeting ended, the surveillance shifted into a more cloak-and-dagger mode. Suddenly

1

Prior to administrative reorganization in 1969, Troop C had responsibility for monitoring dissent at UCCC, SUNYNew Paltz, and other Ulster County colleges. Thereafter, Troop F Special Services branch assumed the role.

1

anxious to conceal his identity, the investigator dashed into a nearby building, pulled out a
Minox miniature spy camera, and snapped several photographs of students as they wandered off
to class. To aid in identifying individuals captured in the photos, State Police later relied on the
knowledge of both their own student informant and another UCCC campus mole who regularly
supplied Kingston police with information on campus leftists. Finally, an informant procured a
UCCC Campus Directory which allowed investigators to match names with addresses. Within
days of receiving their initial tip, the NYSP had completed an impressive intelligence profile of
UCCC’s fledgling antiwar movement. And all it took was one meeting.2

Later that summer, on August 14, 1969, investigators assigned to Troop A’s Special Services
detail learned valuable intelligence on a local radical group. After months of working to provide
publicity and legal support for two young draft resisters and seven of their allies, the Buffalo
Nine Defense Committee was running short of funds. One of Troop A’s student informants at
the State University of New York at Buffalo provided investigators with the committee’s onepage mimeographed flyer, titled “An Urgent Plea for Help,” which asked for financial
contributions “of any size” to “prevent the frame-ups of the anti-war activists going to trial.”
The flyer also advertised a benefit party, to be held at a local hall on the first anniversary of the
police raid that led to the arrest of the nine local militants.3 Billed as the “Big Unbirthday of the
Buffalo Nine Bust,” the party would feature live music, antiwar “rap sessions” and poetry.

2

Case 238-880-1, n.d. [prob. Jul. 1969], Box 89, New York State Police Bureau of Criminal Investigation Reports,
Non-Criminal Investigations Files, New York State Troopers Files, New York State Archives, Albany, New York
(hereafter New York State Non-Criminal Investigation Files).
3
On August 19, 1968, dozens of city and state police, federal marshals and agents from the FBI violently broke up a
nearly two-week-long encampment by two draft resisters in a Buffalo Unitarian Church. After release on bail, the
city’s vibrant New Left community—centered around the State University of New York at Buffalo—quickly
organized to support the resisters, along with seven of their supporters who were also arrested. Over the ensuing
months, news of their legal travails dominated headlines of the student press and became a cause célèbre of
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After receiving this tip, Special Services personnel quickly sprang into action.
Investigators notified their colleagues at the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); gained
permission from the hall’s owner to install a covert tape recorder so police could listen in on the
proceedings; and induced a local dentist to allow his office—conveniently located across the
street from the hall—to be used as a surveillance location.
Stakeouts can be mind-numbing affairs when hours go by with little to observe. In this
case, there were not even crimes being committed—only young people expressing their
solidarity with the Buffalo Nine, enjoying psychedelic music by a group called Pharmacy Jones,
Inc., and hearing speeches by New Left professors. But the time probably passed more quickly
because Special Services personnel could enjoy the company of their friends in the close-knit
fraternity of fellow red-hunters. Joining them in the dentist’s office for the August 19
surveillance operation were FBI agents and members of the Buffalo police department’s local
red squad. They manned their post from 9 a.m. until 10:30 p.m. From the time the benefit began
at 1 p.m. until dusk, “photographs were taken of all persons entering or leaving the hall.”
Although State Police did most of the heavy lifting, arranging to have special tape
recording and photography equipment on hand, their partners in the FBI and in the Buffalo
police played key roles, helping to analyze and identify 23 individuals photographed entering or
leaving the hall. Those attendees were identified by name and organizational affiliation. As a
report later noted:
All of these peopel [sic] have been previously listed as having been involved in marches,
demonstrations or disturbances, and are under various Special Services Case Numbers in
the Troop ‘A’ Special Services Files. All of the above are New Left Activists and Leaders
[sic] from both the State University of New York at Buffalo and State University College
at Buffalo campuses and represent leadership and membership of most of the Left
organizations in the Buffalo area.
Buffalo’s resistance movement. See Kenneth Heineman, Campus Wars: The Peace Movement at American State
Universities in the Vietnam Era (New York: NYU Press, 1992), 210-211.
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A State Police investigator subsequently forwarded all this information to his supervisors at
Troop A’s control center, in Batavia, and to Division Headquarters in Albany for review,
analysis, and placement in the appropriate intelligence files. On October 21, when a jury
convicted two of the Buffalo Nine on their respective charges and student protests erupted on the
university campus, Special Services personnel were there, too, just as they would be present to
monitor virtually every public demonstration in the state during the 1960s and 1970s.4

A. Intelligence, Subversion, and the BCI
Such sophisticated surveillance of nonviolent protesters was a major focus of the NYSP during
the turbulent 1960s. Bearing primary responsibility for carrying out these activities was the
NYSP’s detective arm, the Bureau of Criminal Investigation (BCI). In contrast to the uniformed
troopers who responded to the scene of a crime, BCI agents were plainclothesmen who often
worked undercover. Although the BCI spent much of their time investigating criminal activity
like burglaries and homicides, their personnel also took on thousands of “non-criminal
investigations” each year. The BCI’s Special Services detail handled all noncriminal cases
pertaining to “subversive activities” in the state, ranging from investigating the backgrounds of
State Police applicants to snooping on peace activists.
The New York State Police had been involved in political surveillance since its founding
in 1917, when troopers aided U.S. Army Intelligence during World War I. In the 1920s, State
Police personnel often visited areas of labor unrest to covertly gather intelligence before strike
deployments. The BCI dates its origins to 1935, around the time the NYSP began a decades-

4

Case 238-1559-1, Jan. 1, 1971, Box 90, New York State Non-Criminal Investigation Files.
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long systematic surveillance of the state’s Communists, many of whom were involved with labor
unions in industrial centers like Buffalo.5 With passage of the 1948 Feinberg Law and
subsequent state legislation mandating loyalty oaths for teachers, professors, and others
employed by the state, the NYSP filled a growing need for a “counter-subversive gatekeeper to
New York public employment.” The BCI’s Criminal and Subversives Section, as the Special
Services detail was then known, carried out this responsibility by investigating the political
sympathies of state employees who were suspected of having ties to Communist or other
subversive groups.6
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the BCI expanded its remit to include coverage of
public protest activities. As BCI agents later told members of a New York State Assembly Task
Force, plainclothes personnel attended protests undercover and recorded the names of protest
leaders because they feared potential violence. As part of what they saw as their “duty to
maintain order and insure the normal flow of public life,” Special Services personnel employed a
range of techniques— including what agents called “a constant surveillance” at virtually every
public demonstration, maintenance of a sophisticated filing system to keep track of subversives,
mail covers and the use of paid and unpaid informants.7 Although the BCI’s counter-subversion
work during the 1960s largely matched the FBI’s in terms of technique, BCI agents apparently
enjoyed far more latitude than their federal partners when it came to target selection.8 During the
period examined in this thesis, the NYSP apparently provided no published guidelines to its BCI
investigators on how to carry out Special Services work. As a New York State Assembly Task
See Gerald Zehavi, “Communists,” in Peter Eisenstadt, ed., The Encyclopedia of New York State (Syracuse:
Syracuse UP, 2005), 376-378.
6
Gerda Ray, “Science and Surveillance: Masculinity and the New York State Police,” in D.G. Barrie and S.
Broomhall, eds., A History of Police and Masculinities (New York: Routledge, 2012), 226 and passim.
7
Report of the Special Task Force on State Police Non-Criminal Files (Albany, NY: New York State Assembly,
1977), 12-13. Hereafter cited as NYS Report.
8
Gerda Ray, “Sixty-Five Boxes: New York State Police Surveillance Files,” OAH Newsletter (Aug. 1990), 4.
5

5

Force later learned, BCI supervisors encouraged agents in the field to “investigate and file
reports on any information they came across concerning political activities.”9 While lax
oversight from New York State legislators created ideal conditions for unregulated police spying
to flourish, the BCI’s operational freedom was also largely due to the dispersed, capillary-like
organization of the State Police.
During the Vietnam Era the NYSP was organized into ten Troops, overseen by Division
Headquarters in Albany. Each Troop covered a particular geographic area, providing patrol and
criminal investigation services to local communities in its jurisdiction (see Figure 1).10 By 1969,
there were one or two BCI investigators at each Troop whose primary assignment was in Special
Services. These investigators maintained lists of subversive individuals and organizations active

Figure 2 NYSP Troop Map, used with permission of the New York State Police Public Information Office.
9

NYS Report, 32, emphasis added.
The exception being Troop T, which covered the New York State Thruway.

10
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in their respective Troop areas, worked closely with FBI field offices and local red squads, and
maintained contact with dozens of informants on college campuses—students, faculty, and
administrators—along with an untold number of community members like the Buffalo dentist
who could be relied upon to assist investigations.11 Available evidence also indicates that the
BCI worked closely with “plant security” personnel at General Electric and other large firms,
sharing intelligence on workers’ political views that might have led to the loss of their jobs.12
This thesis explores how the NYSP viewed such spycraft as a vital part of its role, despite a
stated mission to “ensure highway safety, to prevent crime and [to] enforce the law ...”13 The
chapters that follow explore how the NYSP routinely violated civil liberties as it turned its vast
intelligence apparatus against the student peace movement.
In contrast to the FBI’s far more invasive counter-intelligence work during the 1960s, the
activities of the BCI’s Special Services detail fell under the more benign-sounding category of
intelligence. In intelligence work, law enforcement personnel gather information about a target
or suspect through physical surveillance (commonly known as stakeouts), photography,
undercover informants, and open-source intelligence like flyers and newsletters produced by
targets. Moreover, the NYSP’s countersubversive operations could be further defined as
political intelligence since these methods were typically used to gather political information
(beliefs, organizational affiliations) about a subject. Although Special Services sometimes

Much of the NYSP’s work was centered on small towns and rural communities; since personnel needed special
permission to operate within the boundaries of New York City, the BCI gathered only a limited amount of
intelligence on Big Apple radicals.
12
For more on GE’s partnership with the NYSP, see Gerald Zahavi, “Uncivil War: An Oral History of Labor,
Communism, and Community in Schenectady, New York, 1944-54,” in Robert W. Cherny, Bill Issel, and Kerry
Taylor, eds., American Labor and the Cold War: Grassroots Politics, and Postwar Political Culture (New
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers UP, 2004), esp. 33-4.
13
“State Police, Division of,” FY 2020 Executive Budget, Jan. 15, 2019, https://on.ny.gov/2Nqb8cc.
11
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employed invasion and deception—stealing sign-up sheets, posing as reporters to gain the trust
of subjects, entering a target’s domicile when they were not home—it appears that they ever
actively attempted to disrupt organizing efforts. And while the FBI used its informants as agents
provocateurs to create division within New Left organizations, there is no evidence that BCI
men engaged in similar kinds of dirty tricks.14
Yet even passive intelligence gathering can hamper free speech.15 The sociologist Gary
Marx, in an influential 1974 article, compellingly argued that intelligence work can never be
completely passive.16 For example, the infiltration of a group by informants will always have
some psychological effect on the targets. As Zachariah Chafee, the noted First Amendment
scholar, once noted, “The spy often passes over an almost imperceptible boundary into the agent
provocateur.”17 Similarly, it is difficult to assess a passive police presence at public
demonstrations as wholly innocuous. Frank Donner, author of the preeminent work on red
squads, has written of the chilling effect that overt police surveillance can have on public
protest.18 Even when policing agents attended such events in plainclothes, their demeanor and
formal way of dressing broadcast their identities as undercover policemen.19 Such overt means
of conducting surveillance was but one way the Special Services detail chilled free speech.
Routine investigative work of interviewing neighbors, employers, or teachers about a subject’s

14

NYS Report, 47.
My discussion of the effects of intelligence-gathering draws from David Cunningham, There’s Something
Happening Here: The New Left, the Klan, and FBI Counterintelligence (Univ. of California Press, 2004), 285, n. 3.
16
Gary Marx, “Thoughts on a Neglected Category of Social Movement Participant: The Agent Provocateur and the
Informant,” American Journal of Sociology 80, no. 2 (1974): 402-442.
17
Qtd. in Frank Donner, “The Theory and Practice of American Political Intelligence,” New York Rev. of Books,
Apr. 22, 1971.
18
Frank Donner, Protectors of Privilege: Red Squads and Police Repression in Urban America (Berkeley: Univ. of
California Press, 1992), 67-9.
19
Although BCI agents sometimes went to great lengths to conceal their surveillance, more often they made no such
attempt. Activists at a demonstration could not have missed the presence of dapper “BCI men” snapping their
pictures and jotting notes.
15
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possible “subversive” ties clearly had the potential to damage the personal or professional
reputation of individuals.20
The question of what impact political intelligence gathering had on its victims is beyond
the scope of this study. This thesis focuses on the BCI’s surveillance of student peace activists
between 1965 and 1973, when anti-Vietnam War organizing occurred on campuses across New
York State. This timeline allows for a more manageable thesis project but should not be taken to
suggest that this is the only period in which the BCI targeted subversives nor that the student
peace movement was the only victim of its repressive activities. Instead, as I discuss in Chapter
I, the BCI’s Special Services detail targeted a range of social movement actors, nearly all of
whom were on the left.21
The BCI’s surveillance operations shed light on one of the great untold stories of the
Vietnam Era, illustrating how local and state police intelligence units targeted leftist individuals
and organizations, often but not always in collaboration with the FBI. The period examined here
was a time of social and political upheaval in the U.S. Along with the largest antiwar movement
in the nation’s history, the 1960s and 1970s also saw the emergence of Black Power, Gay
Liberation, second wave feminism, and the prisoners’ rights movement. In response to the
unprecedented upsurge in political and social movements—known collectively as the New
Left—preexisting frameworks for maintaining the status quo expanded and strengthened.
Within the FBI, J. Edgar Hoover used the bureau’s sinister COINTELPRO program to
neutralize these social movements. This program sought to sow dissension through informants

20

See NYS Report, 52-3.
See NYS Report, 11. In its emphasis on tracking leftist individuals and organizations, the NYSP mirrored the FBI.
In 1970, an estimated 95 percent of all the FBI’s political investigations in the field were focused on the New Left.
DeBenedetti & Chatfield, An American Ordeal: The Antiwar Movement of the Vietnam Era (Syracuse University
Press, 1990), 288.
21

9

and forged letters; obtained documents and intelligence through illegal search and seizures; and
brought the Bureau into close collaboration with local red squads. It is important to underline
the vast scope of this effort. By early 1969, 42 of the FBI’s 59 field offices were engaged in
COINTELPRO operations against New Left targets.22 Hoover’s “G-men” took a keen interest in
the nation’s students, spending a substantial portion of their time snooping around colleges and
setting up phone taps on dozens of campuses.23 Although the Bureau lavished special attention
on large land-grant institutions like Penn State and the University of California at Berkeley,
political surveillance was widespread and affected even the smallest and most rural outposts of
American higher education.24
While the FBI was the leader in the campaign to monitor ideas, they were not alone. As
the historian Paul Buhle writes, the Vietnam Era was a time when the FBI, CIA, local police red
squads and others “undertook the most massive campaign of anti-Left intervention since the
McCarthy Era.”25 In the 1960s and 1970s, the New York State Police was one of dozens of
urban, county, and state law enforcement agencies in the nation that actively spied on social
movements. Although they first targeted anarchists and communists in the early twentieth
century (explaining the origin of the moniker red squad), these secretive units later expanded
their targets to include a range of official enemies on the left. Despite their prominence,

22

James Kirkpatrick Davis, Assault on the Left: The FBI and the Sixties Antiwar Movement (Westport, CT: Praeger,
1997), 107.
23
Betty Medsger, The Burglary: The Discovery of J. Edgar Hoover's Secret FBI (New York: Vintage, 2014), 231-2.
According to one account, the FBI had phone taps in places at a quarter of all college and university campuses.
Kirkpatrick Sale, SDS: The Rise and Development of the Students for a Democratic Society (New York: Vintage,
1973), 646.
24
At one time in the late 1960s, an astounding fourteen FBI agents were assigned to the main campus of Penn State,
where the agency also commanded a network of more than 200 student informants—the bureau’s largest at any
campus. Heineman, Campus Wars, 30. For a discussion of FBI activities at Berkeley, see Seth Rosenfeld,
Subversives: The FBI’s War on Student Radicals, and Reagan's Rise to Power (New York: Farrar, Straus and
Giroux, 2012.)
25
Paul Buhle, “Peace Movement,” in Mari Jo Buhle, Paul Buhle, and Dan Georgakas, eds., Encyclopedia of the
American Left (Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1990), 571.
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historians of the period have largely ignored local red squads and focused almost exclusively on
documenting surveillance operations carried out by federal law enforcement.

B. Implications and Literature Review
This thesis seeks to advance the study of one aspect of this much larger topic by looking at New
York State Police surveillance of the Vietnam-era student peace movement. It makes several
significant contributions to the existing historiography on this period. The thesis fills
demonstrates how state and local police contributed to the climate of state repression and
political surveillance during the Vietnam Era; provides the first-ever account of the peace
movement at community colleges; and reveals that antiwar organizing emerged at working-class
colleges much earlier and lasted longer than historians had previously assumed.
The history of red squads troubles the taken-for-granted view of policing as a means of
preventing and controlling crime, showing that law enforcement also serves to subjugate
racialized and subaltern segments of the population and to target those who challenge the status
quo. This repressive function of policing has helped historians understand criminal justice in the
U.S., where a disproportionate share of the prison population is Black and Hispanic and
militarized police routinely crush peaceful protests.26 Historically any groups seen as unworthy

26

A small sampling of valuable contributions by historians to our knowledge of how urban policing reinforces the
dominant political, racial and economic orders includes Simon Balto, Occupied Territory: Policing Black Chicago
from Red Summer to Black Power (Chapel Hill, NC: UNC Press, 2019); Marisol LeBrón, Policing Life and Death:
Race, Violence, and Resistance in Puerto Rico (Univ. of California Press, 2019); Kelly Lytle Hernández, City of
Inmates: Conquest, Rebellion, and the Rise of Human Caging in Los Angeles, 1771–1965 (Chapel Hill: UNC Press,
2017); Daniel S. Chard, “Rallying for Repression: Police Terror, ‘Law-and-Order’ Politics, and the Decline of
Maine’s Prisoners’ Rights Movement,” The Sixties 5, no. 1 (2012): 47-73; Andrew S. Barbero, “Riverfront Reds:
Communism and Anticommunism in Depression Era East St. Louis” (paper presented at annual meeting of the
Peace History Society, Miami Shores, FL, Oct. 21, 2011); and Edward Escobar, Race, Police, and the Making of a
Political Identity: Mexican Americans and the Los Angeles Police Department, 1900-1945 (Berkeley: Univ. of
California Press, 1999.)
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of protection by the state, or which represent a threat to the dominant social order, have suffered
police repression at the hands of red squads.
In 1977, not long after the Special Services detail curtailed its operations, a Special Task
Force of the New York State Assembly found that a gross lack of oversight enabled the NYSP to
“develop a system of intelligence that essentially surveilled ideas.”27 Evidence suggests that
similar conditions enabled red squads to flourish in Los Angeles and other cities.28 But as the
historian Simon Balto has recently noted, it is important not to regard these operations as
anomalous results of corruption or mismanagement but rather as the “logical outcome of the U.S.
culture of policing.”29 “There can be no history of police,” two scholars recently observed,
“without a history of red squads.”30 Although historians recognize its importance, there is hardly
any scholarship on the topic.31 This thesis thus makes a significant contribution to the existing
literature by showing how the NYSP routinely spied on the student peace movement.
While this thesis explores police surveillance of student activists at all types of
institutions, including elite private universities and second-tier state colleges, it gives special
attention to antiwar activities on the State University of New York (SUNY) system’s community
colleges. During the Vietnam Era, these two-year campuses grew at a rapid clip. Between 1959
and 1972, a total of 19 new community colleges became part of the SUNY system. As their

27

NYS Report, 49-50.
See Donner, Protectors of Privilege, 245-289.
29
Simon Balto, presentation to AFROAM 693B, “Rise of the Carceral State,” Univ. of Massachusetts-Amherst, Oct.
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numbers multiplied, two-year campuses became convenient and affordable choices for a growing
number of Empire State students.32
Far from being dissent-free oases where working-class students focused on training for
careers, reports from the period suggest that protest was a regular feature of life at SUNY’s twoyear institutions.33 Yet this reality is rarely acknowledged in the vast literature on the Vietnamera peace movement.34 In Campus Life, historian Helen Lefkowitz Horowitz stated that during
the 1960s, students at community colleges and less selective public universities “eschewed
politics” and “frequently paid no attention to protest.”35 Kenneth Heineman’s Campus Wars
blasted away the empirical basis for part of that claim, showing that non-elite state universities
were indeed home to vibrant antiwar movements during the Vietnam era.36 Campus Wars was a
landmark work and won acclaim for shedding light on the working-class elements of student
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protest, yet even the four state universities in Heineman’s study had smaller proportions of
working-class students than the average community college.37
Building on the momentum generated by Campus Wars, in the 1990s scholars urged their
peers to pursue local, campus-level histories of the peace movement.38 This encouragement paid
off, as illustrated by the surge of interest in such case studies over the subsequent decades.39 Yet
the experiences of two-year colleges must count as one of the most significant remaining gaps in
the historiography of the Vietnam-era peace movement.40 Correcting this deficiency would help
historians better understand the impact of antiwar movements on campuses that by 1969 enrolled
nearly one-quarter of all American college students.41 Since a majority of community college
students were from blue-collar, relatively low-income backgrounds, chronicling the history of
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protest on these campuses would also give historians another angle from which to counter the
persistent myth that antiwar activism failed to penetrate working-class sectors of U.S. society.42
Finally, including the experiences of community college students will further hone our
understanding of the scope and chronology of what one historian has called “the most diverse
and dynamic antiwar movement in U.S. history.”43 The consensus view has been that the
antiwar movement did not appear in rural areas or on less selective college campuses until after
1969, and that the national antiwar movement had three key phases: the teach-ins of Spring
1965, the March on Washington in October 1967, and the Vietnam Moratorium in October
1969.44 However, March 1965 saw the first anti-Vietnam War protests at SUNY-New Paltz,
while organizing activities at community colleges, many of which were located in rural areas,
began to blossom as early as Fall 1967. Campus demonstrations in New York State steadily
increased in number through Spring 1968, reached their high watermark with the October 1969
Moratorium and nationwide protests of May 1970, and even continued to be seen—although at a
greatly reduced rate—throughout the early 1970s.
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C. Organization
Chapter One describes how the NYSP’s political intelligence operations developed during the
1960s in response to growing student unrest. After Governor Nelson Rockefeller appointed FBI
veteran Arthur Cornelius as NYSP superintendent, in 1961, he kicked off a major reorganization
of the state police. Notably, Rockefeller gave Cornelius carte blanche to create a “little FBI”
within the NYSP, increasing the operational tempo of what later became known as the Special
Services detail and strengthening its cooperation with Hoover’s agency. Given the influence of
the FBI at this stage of the NYSP’s development, it should not be surprising to see that anticommunism became the lens through which Special Services viewed the emergence of the antiVietnam War movement. This chapter places the state police in the context of broader networks
of politically motivated policing which saw the Special Services detail work in partnership with
college officials and red squad counterparts at county and municipal police departments across
New York State and throughout the country.
Chapter One also moves through the signal events of the anti-Vietnam War movement’s
first five years, documenting how student activists faced close scrutiny by the state police every
step of the way. During the nationwide teach-ins of 1965, state police involvement was muted.
But as students began actively participating in the antiwar movement, beginning in 1967, Special
Services personnel began to monitor their actions more closely. The chapter will document state
police surveillance of student peace activists during Stop the Draft Week (1967), International
Student Strike Day (1968), the nationwide Moratorium (1969).
Chapter Two continues this story, chronicling how the widespread demonstrations in
May 1970 strengthened the NYSP’s partnerships with college and university administrators. The
chapter’s concluding section challenges the consensus view of historians, which holds that
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following the May 1970 protests, campus protests sharply declined as college students reverted
to their usual apathy. As the state police spy files reveal, hundreds of New York State college
students continued their protests during the 1970-1971 academic year and beyond.45
The Conclusion will assess to what degree this surveillance impacted the student peace
movement. It also examines the ignominious end of state police political intelligence operations,
amidst media exposés and a long-overdue legislative inquiry in the mid-1970s and describes the
findings of the State Assembly task force on police spying. The Conclusion also highlights the
need for further research into state and urban police red squads, dozens of which were active
during the Vietnam War, noting that the scope and impact of their activities still await thoughtful
historical analysis.
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CHAPTER 2
THE ‘LITTLE FBI’ TAKES ON THE PEACE MOVEMENT, 1965-1969
Special Services existed in some form during and immediately following World War II but did
not step into the limelight until Rockefeller’s time in office. A successful businessman and scion
of one of one of America’s wealthiest families, Rockefeller was enamored of Hoover’s agency.
Reportedly a key part of the governor’s plan was to have the State Police become more like a
“little FBI” by encouraging the development of robust criminal intelligence capabilities.46 When
the NYSP’s then-superintendent reportedly balked at the plan, Rockefeller replaced him with 25year veteran FBI agent, Arthur Cornelius, who in turn, filled some of the agency’s top command
posts with other former “G-men.” According to one account, it was during Cornelius’ reign that
Special Services “truly took shape,” and when the NYSP superintendent enjoyed “Hoover-like
powers” to restructure the force, using it to target civil rights activist, the peace movement and
other potential subversives.47
The new superintendent was quite familiar with law enforcement in New York State,
having spent much of his FBI career managing the FBI’s Syracuse and Albany field offices.48
While Cornelius only served six years at the top position in the NYSP before his death in 1967,
during his tenure, he undertook major reforms like improving salaries and giving troopers a 40hour workweek. Cornelius also doubled the size of the police force and grew troop strength to
the highest level in the agency’s history.49 But some of the most significant changes affected the
operations of the BCI. The former FBI man centralized control over field operations by
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assigning a new Deputy Superintendent with responsibility for the NYSP’s detective branch.
Cornelius also designated a Lieutenant for each Troop to supervise BCI operations at the local
level. Between 1961 and 1967, the BCI grew from a force of around 240 men to 423.50 During
that time, the number of cases assigned to the BCI nearly tripled (see Table 2). Although the
NYSP did not always publicly report the number of non-criminal investigations assigned to the
BCI, available data suggest that the number of non-criminal cases (assigned to the Special
Services branch) also grew at a comparable rate.

Table 1: Cases Reported to the BCI, 1961-1970.
Year
Total Cases
Non-criminal
(subversive) Cases
1961

10,502

n/a

1962

14,465

n/a

1963

21,726

n/a

1964

24,631

n/a

1965

26,730

n/a

1966

29,931

4,908

1967

32,320

5,739

1968

37,156

6,105

1969

34,505

4,915

1970

38,300

5,936

Source: NYSP annual reports, 1961-1970, New York State Library, Albany, NY.
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As the BCI’s caseload rose in the early 1960s, the countersubversive unit focused much
of its attention on the civil rights movement. At the FBI, Cornelius had worked under Hoover, a
fierce opponent of the movement, for a quarter-century. Not surprisingly, Cornelius brought to
his retirement job a similar attitude of suspicion towards Black Americans who sought to
eradicate racism.51 That the FBI tried to influence the NYSP’s investigations of civil rights
activists is clearly seen in the effort to smear Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., as a Communist. Prior
to Governor Rockefeller’s December 1964 meeting with Dr. King, Hoover’s agency arranged to
have Cornelius brief the Governor concerning the Communist background of key King advisor,
Stanley Levison. “Either Cornelius did not make much of an impression,” an FBI memorandum
ruefully noted, “or Rockefeller chose for reason of political expediency to ignore it inasmuch as
we learned in October 1965 that Rockefeller gave King a $25,000 donation, spoke in King’s
church in Atlanta, and had dinner with King’s father and his family.”52 Although the NYSP
failed to influence the governor’s relationship with King, it continued monitoring civil rights
activities at the grassroots for years to come.53
Under Cornelius, the NYSP also emphasized closer cooperation with other law
enforcement agencies. Naturally, the intelligence-sharing would include the FBI. But countersubversive investigators regularly sought information from the Internal Revenue Service, and the
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BCI Rolodex included the intelligence divisions of numerous local, state and county police
agencies. As Cornelius’ successor, William Kirwan, would later recall: “Like good police, we’d
exchange police intelligence on a need-to-know basis.”54 Besides the FBI, some of the chief
beneficiaries of the NYSP’s file-sharing arrangement included police intelligence units in
Rochester, Syracuse, Buffalo, and New York City. Red squads in those cities were also frequent
collaborators with the BCI in its counter-subversive investigations. Beyond major metropolitan
departments and their fully equipped red squads, the BCI could also count on assistance from
local law enforcement in smaller cities like Rome and Binghamton, each of which had
“community relations officers” who acted as Special Services liaisons. (See Appendix.)
What all these police intelligence units had in common was a tendency to view any type
of leftist social activism through the either-or lens of anti-communism. Particularly alarming to
law enforcement was the campus peace movement and its standard-bearer, Students for a
Democratic Society (SDS). In June 1964, two years after its founding at the University of
Michigan, SDS first came onto the NYSP radar when the New Left organization sponsored a
conference in the Catskills. On June 3 a member of the Michigan State Police antiradical unit
called a senior investigator in the BCI to provide a history of the SDS and share intelligence on
who would lead the conference. “The organization,” read a BCI agent’s summary of the call,
“although not Communist, is a Socialist group that has been infiltrated by the non-party
Communists and also negroes who have been connected with some sit-in movements.”55 Such
intelligence-sharing relied on an informal system of quid pro quo. In return for their assistance,
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the Michigan State Police asked for intelligence from the BCI if the NYSP should learn of
anyone traveling from Michigan to the SDS meeting in the Catskills.
A memo sent to the BCI by Chicago’s local red squad, dated December 7, 1966, provides
additional insight into the kinds of intelligence on the student left that the NYSP regularly
consumed. It stated that SDS was “one of the most active, militant and aggressive groups” of the
New Left and was “in the transitional state of becoming a communist-front [sic] following the
aims and objectives of the Communist Party-USA.”56 Unmentioned was the fact that SDS
pursued a largely nonviolent approach at this point in its history, or that growth of the
organization was driven mainly by student opposition to the Vietnam War.57 For the State
Police, any person involved in any way with antiwar protest was ipso facto subversive. This
dubious line of thinking underwrote a years-long campaign of “constant surveillance,”
infiltration by informants, and civil liberties violations on a massive scale.
To supplement these memos, Special Services personnel also subscribed to a number of
right-wing “intelligence newsletters” such as Pink Sheet on the Left, edited by a former redhunter with the House Un-American Activities Committee. Thus, the BCI’s anti-communist
ideology, reinforced by the presence of former FBI agents in the upper echelons of the NYSP
and through correspondence with other red squads, shaped the lens through which the BCI
viewed the emerging student peace movement in New York State.
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A. Emergence of Antiwar Protest
In early 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson took several critical steps towards escalating the war
in Vietnam. By agreeing to deploy tens of thousands of troops, Johnson foreclosed any hope that
it would have a quick resolution. (“It will be a long war,” Defense Secretary Robert McNamara
told reporters later that year.58) A commitment to using ground troops also meant that the war
would be fought by draft-eligible working-class men.59 The strategy of relying on the draft at
this stage, as historians Maurice Isserman and Michael Kazin have written, allowed Johnson to
avoid calling up either the National Guard or reserves, “potentially controversial steps that could
raise further questions about the necessity of the war.”60 While meant to stem controversy, the
decision to rely on the draft would provide a generation of youth a very concrete reason to resist
the war.
As New York State college students began taking a more active role in the antiwar
movement, the State Police countersubversive detail closely monitored their actions. On
February 19, 1965, an antiwar group at Syracuse University held its first-ever demonstration on
campus. Students involved with the three-week-old Ad Hoc Committee for Peace in Vietnam
originally planned to hold a series of short speeches, but it was so cold and windy on the day of
the event that the speakers stayed home. Still, around a dozen students braved the cold weather
in an icy vigil outside the campus chapel, holding signs protesting the U.S. military’s
involvement in Vietnam. On a flimsy card table, protestors presented petitions, including one
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entitled “A Declaration of Conscience,” in which signers pledged to refuse to serve in the draft
and to support all actions impeding the war effort.61
The fledgling group was eager to get its message out to the broader community and had
arranged for local newspapers to publicize their action in advance. While other students passed
out antiwar leaflets to passersby, the committee’s spokesperson, a graduate student in political
science, agreed to speak with a man claiming to be a reporter. After sharing his views on the
situation in Vietnam, the graduate student and his fellow activists posed for a series of
photographs. Unbeknownst to the group, the “reporter” was in fact an undercover BCI
investigator who later forwarded the students’ names, photographs, and organizational
affiliations to NYSP Division Headquarters for placement in the agency’s “subversive” files.
Also in February, Troop C Special Services personnel began efforts to cultivate a spy
network at SUNY-New Paltz. In a subsequent memorandum to the Deputy Superintendent in
charge of the BCI, Captain A.J. Robson reported that they had successfully enlisted one “white
male student as a Security Informant.” In just their first week as campus mole, this student
enrolled himself in a civil rights study group and forwarded information to his handlers on an
upcoming protest against U.S. policy in South Vietnam. While Captain Robson noted that this
information was the first indication of any interest in anti-Vietnam War protest from within the
Troop C area, continued escalation of the war ensured that it would not be the last.62
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B. Teach-Ins
Antiwar protests in 1965, as historian Christian Appy has written, “were generally small and
well-mannered affairs,” and the best expression of this sort of “well-mannered affair” was the
teach-in.63 Originating at the University of Michigan in the spring of 1965, dozens of colleges
across the country were quick to adopt the basic concept—lectures, debates and seminars on U.S.
foreign policy—on their own campuses. The growing antiwar movement angered many in the
Johnson administration. In his public statements, FBI director Hoover, the self-appointed
spokesman for U.S. law enforcement, reinforced the conflation of Communism and peace
activism. The teach-ins, Hoover told the House Appropriations Committee in March, showed
“how unified, organized, and powerful an element the Communist movement is in the United
States today.” In April, around 70,000 demonstrators marched in Washington, D.C. Organized
by SDS and Women Strike for Peace, it was the first mass protest against the war and for Hoover
only further confirmed the student left’s subversive potential. Later that month, the FBI director
launched a large-scale investigation of SDS.64 The scrutiny intensified at once.
At an April 29 teach-in at SUNY-Brockport, several professors shared their views on
American intervention in Vietnam. Shortly thereafter, two of their number were summoned to a
meeting with an agent from the FBI’s Rochester office. As one faculty member later recalled,
the FBI agent inquired as to the views expressed at the teach-in by antiwar professors. The FBI
agent also asked one of the professors to serve as a regular informant for Hoover’s agency; when
the faculty member balked at the request, the agent abruptly ended the interview.65
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In May, Cornell was the site of one of the region’s first instances of radical civil
disobedience. The BCI knew about this action well in advance, thanks to an undercover
informant working for Troop C Special Services branch, T-1, who successfully infiltrated
Cornell’s Ad Hoc Committee on Vietnam. In this capacity, T-1 attended a planning meeting
where dozens of activists pledged to interrupt the annual Presidential Review of Reserve Officers
Training Corps (ROTC) cadets in an act of nonviolent civil disobedience. Perhaps because he
had advance warning from the BCI, the University’s president appeared unruffled when around
75 demonstrators entered Barton Hall, three abreast—in military fashion—and stood before the
review stand. Although the review went on without interruption—the president simply left his
seat and moved past protestors to inspect cadets—the protest resulted in disciplinary action for
dozens of students.66
This BCI informant at Cornell stayed busy throughout the summer. On July 7, T-1
advised his handlers of an upcoming open-air meeting in the Arts Quad, organized by the
university’s anti-Vietnam War committee. Addressing a crowd of over 200, a Cornell professor
portrayed the war in Vietnam as a symptom of moral rot in the U.S.: “The problem is not
winning or losing wars but that the real problem is what has happened to America.”67 Two
weeks later, on July 30, T-1 obtained the names of students and faculty involved with leading
antiwar activities during Cornell’s summer session. Armed with that list of names, on August
23, a Troop C BCI investigator combed through his Troop’s subversive files and collaborated
with personnel at the Cornell Safety Office to develop background information on four of the
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protest organizers. A full report on their activities was then sent to Division Headquarters, where
it added to the growing collection of intelligence on the student peace movement.68
Over the weekend of October 15-16, 1965, more than 100,000 people in eighty U.S.
cities peacefully marched and engaged in forms of direct action against the war. Among the
campuses taking part was SUNY-Buffalo, whose 500-student campus SDS chapter sponsored a
teach-in and march on the downtown Federal Building.69 That weekend’s activities marked the
largest national action to date and signaled the growing strength of what was soon to become a
mass movement.

C. The Beginning of Active Resistance
The momentum generated by mass actions in the fall carried over to the spring semester. The
historian Stewart Burns has described 1966 as a year when the antiwar movement was
“percolating at the grassroots.”70 Naturally, this caused increasing concern among the FBI and
their partners in the NYSP’s countersubversive unit. In February, Hoover declared that a
“communist conspiracy” was trying to “captivate the thinking of rebellious-minded youth and
coax them into the communist movement itself or at least agitate them into serving the
communist cause.”71 While the FBI director exaggerated their threat, it is true that student
activists became more militant over the course of the year.
In spring 1966, Marist College provided a case study in the student body’s gradual
transition from apathy to outrage. Long before he became a noted scholar of the U.S. peace
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movement, Charles Howlett was a sophomore history major at the Catholic-affiliated school,
located just north of New Paltz, in Poughkeepsie. “By the time I came to Marist in the fall of
1964,” Howlett later recalled, “Vietnam was some far distant place on the other side of the world
with little to no connection to my own personal life.” This began to change in the fall 1965
semester, when NBC News correspondent John Sharkey visited campus to present a frank and
unflattering portrayal of the war. By the next semester, Marist students were joining legions of
other young Americans who were eager to learn about America’s policy in Vietnam. Given that
their more prestigious neighbors in the Hudson Valley—Vassar and Bard—had been relatively
free of student antiwar protest, Marist’s student organizers also saw a proposed teach-in as a way
to raise the visibility of their small liberal arts college.72
After much hard work, Marist students succeeded in lining up high-profile intellectuals to
speak at the event, including historian Staughton Lynd, Father Daniel Berrigan and (for the prowar side) John Lodge, brother of former U.S. Senator from Massachusetts and ambassador to the
United Nations, Henry Cabot Lodge. On the sunny afternoon of March 22, 1966, they saw their
organizing pay off with hundreds of students from the surrounding area pouring onto the Marist
campus. But as they proceeded to the venue, an art gallery in a gleaming new campus building,
attendees were greeted by the glowering faces of New York’s finest. As Howlett later wrote,
“each guest was met by members of the New York State Police and required to sign their name
on a sheet. I suspected that this was for the purpose of keeping tabs on suspected radicals and
members of the Students for a Democratic Society attending the event. It did turn out that I was
correct on that score.”73
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As Marist students were beginning to come into their political consciousness, by the fall
SDS chapters had already formed at SUNY campuses in Cortland and Stony Brook.74
Meanwhile, SDS leaders at SUNY-Binghamton, in New York State’s southern tier, had been
organizing around the Vietnam issue all year. The growing university was off the radar of the
BCI, whose investigators failed to attend a May 14 rally because of more pressing countersubversive duties elsewhere.75 But later in the year their efforts to adequately monitor SUNYBinghamton’s student left gained a boost with the assignment of Patrolman Anthony Ruffo to the
city police department’s newly created Community Relations Office. In public, Ruffo’s new role
had him coordinating the department’s Toys for Tots program, taking major responsibility for
handling media inquiries, and coordinating the Police Athletic League’s outreach to area youth.
In his other, less public role with the Binghamton Police Department, Ruffo assisted Troop C
Special Services personnel with their counter-subversive investigations.76
On December 10, 1966, when students traveled by bus to a protest in downtown
Binghamton, Ruffo arranged to have his department’s personnel photograph the marchers from
the second floor of a retail building across the street. Ruffo subsequently worked with SUNYBinghamton’s campus security to help identify students seen in the photographs, sending the
pictures—along with names and affiliations—to Special Services for analysis and inclusion in
their intelligence files.77
Less than a week later, on the morning of December 16, 1966, an FBI agent advised
Troop C Special Services branch that there would be a rally later that day on Cornell
University’s Arts Quad, followed by a march from campus to the nearest draft board office in
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downtown Ithaca. At the noontime rally, students and faculty engaged in symbolic protest by
decorating a Christmas tree with toy guns, helmets and green berets before setting it alight. After
a few short speeches, the group—which by this time included an informant working for the
BCI—proceeded towards the local draft board. Two weeks later, BCI investigators stopped by
the office of the Ithaca Journal and obtained negatives of photographs taken by the newspaper’s
staff photographer of the Cornell rally and subsequent march. The BCI men then forwarded
these negatives to Troop C headquarters for identification, analysis, and inclusion in the Special
Services intelligence files.78
Infiltration by police informants and other unconstitutional practices may not have been
exactly what SUNY Chancellor Samuel Gould had in mind when he addressed the 1966
graduates of the New York State Police Academy. “There may have been a time when an officer
needed merely to know the law and the techniques of enforcing it,” Gould said in his October
commencement address, “but today I am sure his duties are more numerous and are founded on
quite a different set of principles.”79 Quite different, indeed. As antiwar activism entered a
militant new phase, the State Police would continue to go far beyond traditionally understood
law enforcement practices by probing ever deeper into the student peace movement.

D. The Rise of Anti-Recruiting Protests
By spring 1967, as the White House pressed its intelligence agencies to show links between
antiwar dissent and Communist subversion, student peace activists turned their attention to a
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frequent campus visitor: the military recruiter.80 During the 1966-67 academic year, around a
quarter of U.S. universities experienced protests against military, CIA or defense industry
recruiters.81 As Kirkpatrick Sale has noted, in his monumental study of the SDS, part of the
reason anti-recruiting protests proved so popular with the student left is that they blended a
variety of different issues. First and foremost, anti-recruiting actions provided protestors with a
local, tangible way to confront the war machine. At the same time, they also demonstrated
against the university’s complicity with the recruiting apparatus which made the Vietnam War
possible. Finally, when university administrations responded by calling in police to break up
anti-recruiting protests, as they often did, such demonstrations evolved into free speech fights.82
On March 21, around a dozen members of the SDS chapter at SUNY-Binghamton
picketed the presence of Navy recruiters in the campus Student Center. In a mimeographed
statement distributed to onlookers (and later obtained by the State Police), SDS explained their
opposition to on-campus recruiting:
The U.S. Navy is not recruiting students for just another job—at this point their business
is murder and they are recruiting students for the position of murderers—whether in an
executive capacity or in the actual dropping of burning jelly on civilians. The action of
our college administration (which has not had the guts to take a strong stand against U.S.
atrocities) in approving the presence of these professional murderers on campus is
insulting.
Although BCI investigators were at Cornell covering a visit by Secretary of State Dean Rusk,
SUNY-Binghamton’s campus security director kindly furnished Special Services personnel with
the protest leader’s name, date of birth, and other private information.83
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On April 20, a high-ranking official at SUNY-New Paltz phoned the BCI to advise that a
student group was negotiating with campus administrators over the issue of military recruiting.
Over the following few days, the official kept state police apprised of rising tensions on campus.
The administration’s initial stance was to allow the anti-recruiting protest so long as it took place
outside the College Union Building (CUB). At first, students agreed. But on the morning of
April 24, members of the New Paltz Committee to End the War in Vietnam flouted the rules,
entered the building and began to set up their literature table as well as a 15-foot-long poster
which read: “RECRUITERS ARE THE PIMPS OF DEATH.” The Committee also released a
statement, part of which read: “We are opposed to the presence of the Marines because they are
corrupting the purpose of the University, from a center of life to a center for death.”84 In
response, faculty members attempted to deescalate the situation by facilitating communication
between anti-recruiters and the administration. But this seemed only to worsen the crisis. By
2:00 p.m., there were around 40 demonstrators sitting on the floor of the CUB.85
Although student activists were careful not to block access to Navy and Marine recruiting
tables, college administrators wanted the demonstration to end immediately. As State Police
officials argued with the administration over whether they or the county sheriff had the authority
to make arrests, the situation eventually petered out when the recruiters left campus in the
afternoon. Later that evening, when a New Paltz faculty member co-led a workshop on civil
disobedience in the CUB, Special Services personnel made sure that one of their informants, CS3, would be available to infiltrate the meeting. CS-3 reported that during the workshop, faculty
and students discussed whether they were willing to face arrest the next day, when recruiters
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were again scheduled to be in the CUB. Although the majority of those in attendance had no
strong desire to be arrested, they said they would submit to it if it would help their cause.
The next morning, as student activists arrived at the CUB to set up posters, the most
senior supervisor of Troop C’s BCI unit joined other investigators on campus to personally
monitor the situation. It was an indication of just how seriously Special Services was treating the
developments at SUNY-New Paltz.
By the afternoon, as students staged another sit-in to protest the presence of Marine
recruiters, days of protest had created a tense situation. Soon dozens of counter-protesters were
marching into the CUB carrying an American flag and BCI agents scrambled to confirm rumors
that construction workers at a job site on campus were threatening to attack any students they
saw burning Old Glory. But open confrontation was averted, and by the end of the day sheriff’s
deputies had dislodged the sit-in and made 29 arrests.
The departure of the bus full of shackled students might have signaled the end of the
protest, but serious surveillance work remained to be done. After State Police investigators met
with CS-3 to collect identifying information of professors and students who had been actively
involved (but not arrested) in the protests, they contacted the Kingston office of the FBI to share
everything they had learned.
The next day, on April 25, another undercover informant advised the BCI that some
SUNY-New Paltz “agitators” would be attending an antiwar meeting at a private residence in
nearby Wappinger Falls. After BCI investigators were dispatched to the scene, Special Services
personnel lurked outside and recorded the license plate numbers of attendees. Inside the house,
yet another informant—a 22-year-old male, most likely a SUNY-New Paltz student—acted the
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part of an antiwar activist by sitting in on the meeting and taking copious notes that he later
provided to his handlers at the BCI.

E. March on Washington and Stop the Draft Week
Later that year, in Washington, D.C., the Johnson administration’s decision to deploy over
400,000 U.S. troops and initiate a massive bombing campaign led to high casualty rates and an
accompanying need for replacement personnel. When nineteen-year-olds moved to the top of
the draft list that summer, it catalyzed an antiwar movement which channeled much of its
energies into a planning an October 21 march on the nation’s capital. At first, the BCI struggled
to keep track of this diffuse and dynamic movement.
On September 19, Troop B in Northern New York learned of a request by police in
Washington, D.C., whose local red squad desired “all available information” related to the
upcoming demonstration in their city, “particularly numbers of persons coming, leaders, groups
participating, mode of travel, anticipated time of arrival and departure, and any other information
that would be of interest.” Fanning out to interview their contacts, Troop B Special Services
personnel soon found that their informants at area colleges had little to say about students
traveling to D.C. It was only after the fact, at a day-long conference organized by the Northern
New York Committee for Alternatives in Vietnam, that an undercover BCI agent learned that
around 30 students and faculty from SUNY-Potsdam, Clarkson University, and St. Lawrence
University had indeed traveled to the March on Washington.86
This mass demonstration, estimated to have been attended by more than 200,000 people,
marked a major turning point for the New Left. Author James Carroll states that this day was the
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moment when “the peace movement became a mass phenomenon.”87 Stop the Draft Week, a
series of nationwide protests, coincided with the March on the Pentagon and was the occasion for
the first-ever recorded demonstration at Dutchess Community College (DCC). In reaction to a
Marine recruiting visit to this campus, located in Poughkeepsie (a riverfront city 80 miles north
of Manhattan), four students set up a table outside the Office of Student Affairs and distributed
antiwar literature. Some of the same DCC students participated in a similar action on November
8, when army recruiters came to campus. In between the two events, two of the studentorganizers formed a Peace Club which received support from around 70 students. Later in the
month, the same two students traveled together to the home of a SUNY-New Paltz professor
where they helped plan for an upcoming antiwar rally at nearby Vassar College. Much of this
intelligence came to Special Services by way of “a Federal source of known reliability” who
closely tracked DCC’s student activists.88
For his part, Selective Service Director Lewis Hershey responded to the March on
Washington and Stop the Draft Week by writing a letter to the nation’s local draft boards. In the
memo, the draft director suggested that college students who involved themselves in antirecruiting or anti-draft activities could be stripped of their deferments and subject to immediate
call-up.89 Thus, by gathering and sharing intelligence on the identities and actions of DCC’s
anti-recruiting demonstrators, Special Services and the FBI were laying the groundwork for a
potential punitive action—including loss of deferments—at some later date.
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On December 5, two days after the Vassar rally and a month after Hershey’s agency
announced its new policy, an FBI source informed Special Services that students at Rockland
Community College (located close to the New Jersey border) were busy organizing against the
draft. On this campus, the secretary for a group that hoped to start an SDS chapter was
distributing “Complicity Statement” forms to students. Each half-page form contained a pledge
to “knowingly advocate” draft resistance and support youth who had defied the government’s
authority in drafting them into the military. Those who signed this statement were committing
acts of civil disobedience against what they viewed as an illegal war.90
Stop the Draft Week had the effect of politicizing the student population. During the
1967-1968 school year, anti-draft protests occurred at a quarter of all US colleges, and half of all
large public universities.91 As Michael Stewart Foley has noted, by advocating open resistance
to the draft, such protests “raised the stakes for both the rest of the antiwar movement and the
Johnson administration.”92 Student activism in Rockland and Dutchess counties illustrate, as
well, how fall 1967 marked an increase in antiwar activism among students at New York State’s
less selective colleges that continued through the early 1970s.
The following January’s Tet Offensive was a major turning point in the Vietnam War.
Before Tet, President Johnson could rely on a relatively compliant press corps to put a positive
spin on the American war effort. Showing progress was far more difficult after Viet Cong
guerillas and North Vietnamese troops launched attacks on five of the country’s six largest cities
and dozens of U.S. military installations.93 Tet illustrated the bankruptcy of U.S. military
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strategy, led to the first basic review of war policy in three years, and ultimately factored into
Johnson’s decision not to seek reelection.94 “If there was a beginning of the end to America’s
war in Vietnam,” one historian recently wrote, “Tet provided it.”95 Images of the Tet Offensive,
beamed into millions of Americans’ living rooms through network news coverage, turned many
more against the war.
On January 8 and January 9, BCI investigators worked undercover to monitor antirecruiting protests at SUNY-New Paltz. Antiwar students and faculty were incensed by the
college administration’s decision to rescind a short-lived policy banning military recruiters from
campus.96 On January 9, as 50 protesters picketed the presence of a Marine recruiting team in
the College Union Building, they squared off with a smaller group of counter-demonstrators
calling themselves the Semper Fidelis Society. The anti-recruiting demonstrators, led by campus
chapters of SDS and Vietnam Veterans Against the War, wore red-stained clothing (claimed to
be actual human blood) and carried picket signs reading “Join Marines—Kill Children,” and
“Marines are Recruiting Killers.” Although SDS had five student marshals to keep the protest
nonviolent, Special Services apparently took the situation so seriously that they dispatched Troop
C’s highest-ranking BCI man to campus for a briefing and to personally monitor the situation.
Special Services later worked with the SUNY-New Paltz campus security director and the FBI to
help identify the names of faculty and students involved in the protest.97
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The next month, the college SDS chapter joined with the New Paltz Peace Council and a
group of concerned faculty to sponsor an open meeting on “Military Recruiting and the
University.” In a mimeographed statement, provided to Troop C Special Services personnel by a
campus informant, SDS leaders framed the struggle over recruiting as a concrete, tangible way to
oppose U.S. policy in Vietnam:
The Marines, the shock troops of American foreign policy, are engaged in the
subjugation of Vietnam, and recruiting is essential to that operation. This is the context in
which the problem of military recruiting on campus must be discussed … Once the
relationship of the Marines, the university and American society is understood, the
question arises: what can we do, as members of an academic society? ... We must begin
to refuse to allow our community to become a part of the process which destroys
Vietnam.

Between 8 p.m. and 10:30 p.m., a BCI investigator conducted surveillance of the open forum
from just outside the meeting room. From his covert location, this investigator identified eleven
of the 25 students and faculty attending the meeting, forwarding their information to Troop C
and Division Headquarters.98

F. International Student Strike Day
Over the course of several weeks in April and May, students at Columbia University—led by
SDS chapter leader Mark Rudd—occupied university buildings to protest both the Vietnam War
and a planned expansion that would have displaced residents of a largely Black and Puerto Rican
neighborhood. Police evicted the demonstrators in a bloody free-for-all that left hundreds of
protesters injured and led to a campus-wide strike that cancelled classes for the rest of the
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semester.99 While protest percolated at Columbia, the Student Mobilization Committee to End
the War in Vietnam (SMC) organized the first major antiwar demonstration after Tet. Calling an
International Student Strike Day on April 26, 1968, the SMC urged students to skip classes and
organize teach-ins and other activities calling for an end to the draft, an end to the war in
Vietnam, and support for civil rights in the South. The next day, the National Mobilization
Committee planned to gather students and concerned citizens in New York City for another
demonstration and panel of speakers.
The SMC’s plans perturbed professional red-hunters. On March 22, a thinly sourced
article by conservative syndicated columnist David Lawrence appeared in the Kingston Daily
Freeman under the ominous headline, “Communists Instigate April 26 Disorders.” Lawrence’s
column drew on a recent speech to the House floor in which the chairman of the House UnAmerican Activities Committee portrayed the planned student strike as part of a “worldwide
movement by the Communists.” Lawrence fully agreed, suggesting that subversive forces were
using the SMC to undermine U.S. war aims in Vietnam.100
The Special Services personnel who clipped and filed Lawrence’s column were also
extremely critical of the student mobilization concept. In reports on how students were planning
to respond to the International Student Strike Day, for example, investigators characterized the
SMC as a “Communist-front group” and the coordinated campus actions “part of a world-wide
movement by Communists to undermine public support of the present U.S. Policy [sic] of
resisting Communist aggression in South Vietnam.”101 Even though there was little evidence to
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support such beliefs, the State Police, like the FBI, saw the student peace movement as insidious
because it allowed more destructive ideas—like Communism—to sneak onto campus underneath
the petticoats of pacifism.
In the weeks leading to the strike, student leaders at Sullivan County Community College
(SCCC) and New York Agricultural and Technical College at Delhi, both located in the
Catskills, wrote letters to SMC’s house journal, The Student Mobilizer, indicating that their rural
campuses would participate. A writer for the National Guardian, another New Left publication,
took Delhi Tech’s participation to be a sign of how the antiwar movement was expanding to
include previously untapped constituencies. Special Services personnel, avid readers of both the
local and alternative press, clipped the articles and began coordinating coverage of campuses.102
The State Police surveillance network was growing more extensive every month, and
investigators with the Special Services detail had no difficulty working directly with some
college administrators. To better plan for protests in their region, between April 1 and April 26,
Troop C’s Special Services personnel maintained constant contact with its informants at area
colleges and forwarded information “concerning the progress and participation of individuals at
each campus” to their BCI supervisor at Troop Headquarters.103
At SUNY-New Paltz, State Police investigators learned that the local SDS chapter was
organizing speakers and entertainment for the day of the boycott. An informant, most likely an
employee of the college, furnished investigators with a copy of the SDS chapter’s request for the
use of college facilities. This document allowed state police to obtain the names of speakers
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which were then forwarded to Division Headquarters for review, analysis, and placement in the
appropriate intelligence files.
At Ulster County Community College, investigators met with a dean who provided
information on student participation in the upcoming strike. Both this college official and
another UCCC dean agreed to cover the strike so that the “day’s events would be observed with
detailed information being furnished to the Security Detail.”
During their April 24 visit to SUNY-Oneonta, State Police investigators gathered
intelligence about a professor who was allegedly responsible for stirring up student protest on
campus. Of note, a high-ranking official at the college pledged to task his staff with “keeping
track of the events as they occurred” during the student strike and reporting identities of
participants to the State Police.
On April 26, the student strike involved nearly a million students across the country.
Still, SMC organizers later observed that it was hard to call the action a complete success since
many students probably skipped class for the day without participating in anti-Vietnam War
activities.104 Although it was difficult to parse the data on student participation, it was still
notable that even small two-year colleges held strike-related events. For many students at those
institutions, the strike likely served as a gateway to further involvement in the antiwar
movement. For example, a mass meeting at Westchester Community College, involving around
300 of the school’s 2,000 enrolled students, and a sparsely attended lecture on Vietnam at Delhi
Tech, were the first-ever antiwar demonstrations on those campuses.105
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On April 26, Special Services personnel devoted most of their attention to SUNY-New
Paltz, where the protest leaders had planned a day of activities on the campus lawn. From 10
a.m. until 4 p.m., the local SDS chapter had arranged a line-up of speakers, poetry, live music,
and even an interactive game called “Monopoly Capitalism.” State Police investigators
maintained contact throughout the day with CS-3, one of their campus informants, and the
college’s Director of Security. As CS-3 gathered pamphlets and other evidence of subversion
from student-manned tables and literature racks, BCI investigators snapped surveillance photos
of the speakers. Special Services personnel subsequently conducted follow-up meetings with
CS-3 and the campus security director to determine the identities of 18 student protesters based
on photographic analysis. Throughout the day, Special Services “maintained a constant
surveillance of the activities” at SUNY-New Paltz with “all progress reports being referred” to
Troop C Headquarters.
Because investigators had their hands full monitoring antiwar activities in New Paltz,
Special Services personnel lacked sufficient manpower to cover another well-organized strike
day event at Sullivan County Community College (SCCC), located in the Catskills. Luckily,
they had made arrangements with a campus informant, T-1, whom state police investigators
tasked with being Special Services’ eyes and ears during SCCC’s teach-in on April 26.106
On the day of the student strike at SCCC, Vietnamese poet Vo-Dinh arrived on campus,
having driven from his Pennsylvania home with the aim of reading his work to attendees. Other
featured speakers included a Liberal Party candidate for State Assembly; a writer for a GI
underground newspaper; and a member of a local chapter of Clergy and Laymen Concerned
about Vietnam. As the event kicked off, students popped in and out of the campus lounge area at
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regular intervals to listen to speakers or browse the literature table—all standard fare for an
antiwar teach-in. Special Services’ trusty informant, T-1, performed an admirable job spying for
the State Police. As an investigator later related in his report on the event, T-1 identified all
speakers by name and political affiliation, furnished 17 Polaroid photographs of speakers and
other participants in the teach-in, and procured 25 pamphlets and pieces of literature from a
“peace table” in the student lounge. Of note, photos of two speakers were later provided upon
request to an unnamed “Federal Investigator.”
But the proceedings took a strange turn when uniformed police suddenly entered and
asked all present to immediately vacate the premises. In a phone call that prompted the law
enforcement response, a young man had threatened to kill “all the Communists” with a bomb
planted somewhere near the antiwar event. After a search that lasted all of thirty minutes, the
police ushered attendees back inside to finish their day-long demonstration against the war—just
one of many going on across New York State on April 26 but apparently the only one interrupted
by a bomb threat. The State Police report on this event, including photographs and other
enclosures, totaled eleven pages. As usual, copies were sent to headquarters in Albany, where
participants’ names and personal information eventually found their place in the state police’s
sprawling intelligence files.

G. Outside Agitators
The BCI’s countersubversive unit, conservative student groups and local newspapers often
pinned responsibility for student protest on that reliable scapegoat, the outside agitator.
Although such outsiders were not as common as authorities believed, the agitator conspiracy
persisted partly because it meshed with the belief—popular among law enforcement and school
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officials—that students were themselves incapable of political organization and thus only
protested when impelled to do so by some sinister off-campus influence.107
For many in law enforcement, SDS represented just such a threat to the nation’s youth.
In September 1968, Hoover used his platform in FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin to warn that the
“revolutionary terrorism” of SDS and other New Left groups was “invading college campuses.”
It was therefore necessary for educators and law enforcement to stop this threat, lest SDS
succeed in its campaign to “‘restructure’ our society.”108 According to a former FBI agent, in the
fall Hoover ordered “intensified investigations of student agitators and expanded informant
penetration of campus SDS groups.”109 The case of one Hudson Valley community college
shows how this aggressive strategy played out and illustrates the ways in which blaming outside
agitators could undermine civil liberties and destroy nascent New Left organizations.
Starting in October and continuing throughout the Fall 1968 semester, a group of nine
students interested in forming an SDS chapter at Orange County Community College (OCCC)
coalesced under the leadership of a seasoned student activist on campus.110 In media interviews,
this group sought to distance itself from the controversies surrounding national SDS and claimed
to want greater student participation in campus governance, removal of campus police, and an
end to the OCCC administration’s collaboration with local draft boards. As the effort gained
traction and more students expressed interest in what SDS had to offer, school officials and law
enforcement stepped up their surveillance, enlisting help from student informants and the FBI to
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obtain intelligence on the group. Remarkably, an FBI agent monitoring the campus reported to
the State Police that of the 15 students who attended the initial meeting of SDS, nearly half were
there to secretly gather information on behalf of OCCC administrators.111
The BCI and its partners in the FBI kept close tabs on SDS between its initial meeting in
October and December, when the Student Senate was scheduled to vote on whether to grant the
group a charter (a preliminary step before allowing any student group to request funds and use
space on campus.) Yet in December the Student Senate erected a roadblock. After the Senate
asked SDSers to pledge an oath of allegiance to the school and the state, SDSers ripped up their
proposed charter in a defiant public display. Just as SDS at OCCC appeared to be on the ropes,
the local daily newspaper published a series of articles sowing public suspicion of outside
agitators at OCCC. Days after the charter denial, an unattributed report appeared in the
Newburgh Evening News full of speculation that by allowing an SDS chapter on campus, OCCC
could invite the kind of chaos experienced earlier that year at Columbia. Although the article
was ostensibly about a single student’s decision to withdraw from the OCCC SDS chapter,
words like “riot,” “state of anarchy,” and “havoc” came tumbling from the reporter’s pen. The
writer also gave a platform to an anonymous source in the Student Senate, who suggested that
“the trouble-makers for the most part were not local students” but rather from New York City.
Days later, the same newspaper allowed the student body president, Andrew Zarutskie, to
sound off about how SDS at OCCC was being coached by some outside source. Again, the
Evening News reporter forecast chaos, noting how events at OCCC are “beginning to resemble
the basic pattern of confrontation that eventually led Mark Rudd of Columbia University’s SDS
to stage a riot … that resulted in extensive damage, bloodied heads, and eventual resignation of
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the Columbia University president.” The article also summarized a recent FBI report claiming
that SDS planned to “bomb draft boards and to topple the U.S. government through force.”
Finally, the article quoted Zarutskie as saying that national SDS saw OCCC as a beachhead in its
struggle to infiltrate community colleges: “If they can succeed in getting control of OCCC, they
can use this as a model to take over control [sic] of other [two-year] schools.”112
The student body president need not have worried. On December 6, the BCI’s source in
the FBI had reported that the SDS student leader “had received so much criticism from both
Community [sic] residents and students that he had withdrawn” from OCCC. Less than a week
later, the FBI source informed the BCI that two other key SDSers at the school planned to leave
at semester’s end. In this agent’s view, “without the[ir] leadership … the group would literally
fall apart.” On December 18, the Evening News provided a fitting coda to this story. In an
editorial, aptly titled “The Outsiders,” the newspaper decried those “who are trying to infiltrate
many American colleges and create campus disorders” and praised OCCC’s anti-SDS campaign
before adding that it hoped such efforts would “prevail at other colleges also!”113 It would not be
the first, nor the last time that unconstitutional policing practices, as well as college
administrators’ hostility to the student left, combined to destroy a campus SDS chapter. But it
was easy to overlook the fate of OCCC’s student left because the antiwar movement was about
to enter its most vibrant and dynamic period to date.
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H. Vietnam Moratorium
As numerous scholars have observed, beginning in 1969 the peace movement became far more
diverse, making inroads into faith communities, labor unions, veterans, and students attending
smaller and less selective colleges.114 This change was nowhere more noticeable than on
America’s two-year campuses. As an article in the March 1969 issue of the Journal of Higher
Education noted: “For several years student unrest was primarily on campuses of four-year
colleges and universities. More recently it has become manifest on two-year college
campuses.”115 A report commissioned by the American Association of Junior Colleges found
that during the 1968-1969 academic year, student protests occurred at more than one-third of all
two-year college campuses in the U.S. While this was still a lower rate than one would find at a
four-year university, the report pointed out, “the time has ceased to be when junior colleges were
cloaked with veils of tranquility.”116
On March 7, 1969, Governor Rockefeller held a town hall-style meeting at Suffolk
Community College, located in the sleepy Long Island community of Selden. To greet the
governor, the campus’ 25-member SDS chapter had obtained permission to stand behind
barricades and protest proposed state legislation that would have prevented student activists from
obtaining grants to pay for college. As a battalion of more than 100 Suffolk County police
officers sat in buses near the college in case a more serious disturbance arose, members of the
county police department’s Intelligence Unit stayed close to the action to better monitor the
protest. Three months later, in a follow-up memo to their counterparts in the State Police, the
Intelligence Unit shared a wealth of information on one of the campus SDS leaders, a Vietnam
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veteran—including his military experience, where he attended high school, and even his summer
travel plans.117
In early March, after weeks of protest in solidarity with the Buffalo 9, SUNY-Buffalo
administrators agreed to allow a week-long campus teach-in where students could learn about the
university’s involvement with Project Themis, a $20 million dollar Pentagon program using
dozens of universities for defense-related research.118 While administrators hoped that dialogue
would calm campus tensions, the teach-in seemed to further inflame the situation. On March 19,
several hundred students engaged in a night-long rampage, destroying construction equipment on
the future site of the university’s Pentagon-funded research center. Students then marched into
another building on campus, Hayes Hall, where they smashed doors and windows, climbed the
building’s tower to ring “bells of liberation,” and faced off with a detachment of 150 Buffalo
policemen who soon surrounded the building. Throughout the night and into the early morning
hours, one of the NYSP’s top BCI supervisors and a former Troop C Special Services
investigator, Lieutenant Jim Kaljian, relayed intelligence on the uprising to a top SUNY
administrator. At 7 a.m. that morning, truncheon-wielding policemen watched as 175 students
left Hayes Hall. Facing unprecedented pressure from not only the campus chapter of SDS but
the student newspaper and student government, SUNY-Buffalo’s president soon agreed to hold a
student referendum on the university’s involvement with ROTC and Project Themis.119
While seemingly effective in Buffalo, such confrontational methods were alienating to
many Americans. This is perhaps part of the reason why a majority told pollsters later in the
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year that antiwar protesters were hurting, not helping the cause of peace.120 Disruptive protests
also provided ammunition to critics of the movement, like Hoover, who told a House
subcommittee in April that the New Left was “dedicated to the complete destruction of our
traditional democratic values and principles of free government.”121 Chaotic scenes of campus
unrest also made it harder to recruit potential activists. After all, students were likely more
willing to attend an antiwar rally or teach-in than occupy a campus building.
Far more effective at activating grassroots support for an end to the war was the Vietnam
Moratorium of October 15, when campus protests and curbside vigils drew millions of
Americans in what historians consider the “most potent and widespread antiwar protests ever
mounted in a Western democracy.”122 During an era marked by the symbolic importance of
mass demonstrations at the nation’s capital, the Moratorium was unique in emphasizing smaller,
local actions across the country. “Such moderate tactics,” the historian Michael B. Friedland has
written, “hit a resonant chord among Americans dissatisfied both with the war and with radical
antiwar protesters.”123 Originally conceived as a series of actions that would increase by one day
per month as the war dragged on, interest in continuing protests waned after November 15, when
more than 200,000 Americans attended a Moratorium march in Washington, D.C.
Within the SUNY system, Moratorium demonstrations on October 15 differed depending
on the location and type of institution. At SUNY-New Paltz, participation was nearly universal
as only 45 of 3,800 enrolled students attended classes.124 Meanwhile, the student newspaper of
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Corning Community College, tucked into a rural part of the state’s Southern Tier, noted no
Moratorium-related activities on its campus. At Auburn Community College, located in a
working-class town where many residents worked in the nearby state prison, nearly 400 students,
roughly a quarter of its student body, participated in a silent, orderly march from campus to a
public park. Joining the students in their demonstration were local clergy, parents carrying
toddlers on piggyback, and even the college president.125 On the other end of end of the state,
two-year colleges close to the New York metropolitan area also registered substantial levels of
dissent. In Middletown, some 400 Orange County Community College students, many donning
black armbands, assembled to hear antiwar speakers.126 During a December Moratorium day,
UCCC faculty and students marched through the city of Kingston.127
The Vietnam Moratorium was notable not only for being the largest public protest ever
on a national scale, involving millions of Americans, but also for its relatively peaceful nature.
Aside from a few isolated incidents, Nancy Zaroulis and Gerald Sullivan write in their history of
the antiwar movement, the Moratorium was marked by a degree of restraint that was almost
“Whitmanesque” in its “gentle spirit of comradely acceptance.”128
For some in the New Left, like SUNY-Stony Brook’s radical economist Michael Zweig,
that Whitmanesque spirit was precisely the problem. The Moratorium, Zweig said in an
interview with the Long Island campus’ student newspaper, “channels dissent about the war into
traditional liberal lines in an attempt to disarm the radical movement.” Instead, he said, “It might
just be necessary to overthrow the government.” A top aide to the SUNY Chancellor, reading
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the interview and underlining its most subversive passages, promptly clipped the article and sent
it to a Lieutenant in the Special Services Unit at NYSP Division Headquarters in Albany.129
Despite their nonconfrontational approach, Moratorium protests were still viewed by the
State Police as sites of possible disorder that required constant surveillance. In early November,
as the BCI sought to learn about Moratorium plans at SUNY-New Paltz, Troop F Special
Services maintained contact with two of its “security informants” on campus. While these
informants were helpful, providing BCI investigators with a schedule of upcoming moratoriumrelated events, the BCI men themselves did most of the dirty work. On November 11, one of
their number showed considerable derring-do when he visited an unattended peace table on
campus and stole several lists showing the names and addresses of students who had signed up
for moratorium activities.130
Between November 13 and 14, during two full days of moratorium activities on campus,
Special Services personnel and campus informants listened to antiwar teach-ins and folk music
and even attended an “after party”-type event at the end of the second day. Partygoers did not
stay too long, however, because many planned to rise early the following morning to catch a
charter bus from campus for the massive moratorium march in Washington, D.C. Since Special
Services had a prior engagement that morning, they arranged to have an FBI agent on the scene
to cover the all-important bus departure. So it was that in the predawn hours of November 15, a
G-man observed the comings and goings of four buses. Between 4 a.m. and 5 a.m., this federal
investigator counted precisely 169 passengers who left New Paltz for the nation’s capital, where
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they partook in a march of over a quarter-million people—then the largest-ever mass
demonstration in U.S. history.

The impact of all this activism may have been hard to detect then, but memoirs and declassified
memos have since given scholars a better understanding of the Moratorium’s effect on policy.
Earlier in the year, Nixon had used his National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger, to send a
message to a key diplomat in discussions with North Vietnam: if by November 1 there was no
meaningful progress in negotiations, the U.S. would undertake what Kissinger described to his
staff as a “savage, decisive blow”—dubbed Operation Duck Hook—a massive bombing attack
against targets in North Vietnam, including dikes, along with the mining of harbors and perhaps
even the use of tactical nuclear weapons near the Chinese border. On September 10, 1969,
Kissinger told the president that he should be concerned about the coming Moratorium:
The pressure of public opinion [is] on you to resolve the war quickly, and I believe [it
will] increase greatly, in the coming months. The plans for student demonstrations in
October are well known, and while many Americans will oppose the students’ activities,
they will also be reminded of their own opposition to the continuation of the war.131
As this memo shows, and as Nixon later admitted in his memoirs, the Moratorium curbed his
plans to escalate the war through Operation Duck Hook.132
By the end of the 1960s, despite law enforcement’s efforts to curb the growing student
peace movement, activists were experiencing some small measure of success. As their
movement entered the 1970s, changing shape to assume a smaller and more grassroots
orientation, Special Services would adapt by forming ever-closer bonds with their intelligence
contacts on campuses and in the SUNY Chancellor’s office.
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CHAPTER 3
STATE POLICE AND STUDENT PEACE ACTIVISTS IN THE 1970s

In the summer of 1970, John Mather decided that a simple “thank you” would not do. After the
BCI’s assistance in subduing campus disorders, the Assistant to the SUNY Chancellor wanted to
find creative ways to show his appreciation. Spring semester had brought an unprecedented
wave of protests across SUNY campuses and around the nation. Following President Nixon’s
announcement of his intent to use U.S. troops in a land invasion of Cambodia, rioters set fire to
the ROTC building at the SUNY flagship in Buffalo while class boycotts and other less violent
disturbances sprang up across the state university system—from North Country Community
College in the Adirondacks to downstate campuses like Farmingdale. In the midst of the crisis,
Mather’s boss, Chancellor Samuel Gould, told SUNY college presidents that he feared an actual
“shooting revolution” might erupt unless Nixon reversed course. Yet in nearly every case of
student unrest, BCI agents were on the scene, relaying pertinent intelligence to their partners in
the FBI and soothing frayed nerves in the SUNY Chancellor’s office.
Mather had been in close contact with the BCI since the anti-Themis protests at Buffalo
in spring 1969, and by 1970 was on a first-name basis with key players in the NYSP and its
counter-subversive unit: Superintendent William Kirwan; Colonel George Infante, Assistant
Deputy Superintendent and head of the BCI; and Lieutenant Jim Kaljian, a long-time “BCI man”
who was then stationed at Division Headquarters in Albany, not far from Mather’s desk at
SUNY central office.
In a July 8 note, Mather thanked Infante “for all the help you have given us this year.”
The same day, Chancellor Gould’s right-hand man found time to send a missive to the Assistant
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Counsel to Governor Rockefeller, suggesting that “special merit commendations [be] put in the
personnel jackets of Colonel Infante and Lieutenant Jim Kaljian for their continuous, round-theclock availability and immediate assistance on call during the weeks of campus disorders.” As if
that were not enough, Mather also showed appreciation to the State Police in a most
extraordinary way. When the NYSP superintendent learned that his young relative did not have
the grades to gain admittance to SUNY-Brockport, Kirwan wrote to Mather asking if there were
some way to “break through the barrier of obstacles.” Apparently, Mather had little
compunction about fulfilling this request, for by July 21 Kirwan was firing off a thank-you letter
of his own: “I want you to know that my relative has been accepted at Brockport and I want to let
you know of my sincere thanks for your efforts in this behalf [sic].”133
This correspondence illustrates both the high degree of cooperation between top officials
at SUNY and the NYSP, and the depth of concern about student activism at the Chancellor’s
office. Given how the year began with a period of relative peace on campus, administrators like
Mather were understandably caught off-guard by May’s wave of protests.

A. May 1970 and Beyond
By the beginning of January 1970, there were still 472,000 American troops stationed in
Vietnam. Yet the peace movement seemed moribund. Originally intended to be an ongoing
series of actions, by mid-April the Vietnam Moratorium Committee had officially disbanded.
Once the nation’s most powerful and influential New Left organization, SDS was by then
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seriously weakened by factional strife.134 But student radicals at New Paltz and elsewhere were
still organizing against the war.
On February 26, an undercover informant for the Troop F Special Services detail
attended a meeting at SUNY-New Paltz to discuss plans to protest an upcoming military
recruiting visit. The following day, the mole, codenamed FS-2, conferred with a campus SDS
member, obtained the names and addresses of students leading the anti-recruiting effort, and
furnished this intelligence to Special Services. When a follow-up meeting was held on March 4,
attended by 18 faculty and students, FS-2 and a BCI investigator were present and recorded
details about the planned demonstration. On March 18, another campus informant, FS-1, told his
handlers that the Dean of Students and another college administrator had met with Ulster County
District Attorney to discuss the potential for violence if the college proceeded with its plan to
host military recruiters the following week. After the meeting, administrators mailed letters to
various branches of the armed services formally cancelling the recruiting visits.
On March 24, the date when recruiters had originally planned to arrive on campus,
several Special Services investigators, along with FS-1 and FS-2, conducted surveillance
between 8 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. In one of the few cases where news media took note of Special
Services activity, a reporter for the Kingston Daily Freeman observed: “Three black sedans each
with two uniformed guards, were seen cruising around the campus grounds shortly after 9 a.m.”
From the safety of their state-issued vehicles, the “BCI men” and their informants managed to
identify and record the names and affiliations of ten students, alumni and faculty who were seen
on the quad trying to drum up interest in a protest. Investigators later watched from afar as 28
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Quakers stood in silent vigil to protest recruiting. Throughout the day, Special Services
personnel dispatched periodic updates via Teletype to Division Headquarters in Albany.
While remnants of a once-strong SDS chapter continued to organize at New Paltz, on
many of New York State’s rural campuses SDS had never had much of a presence to begin with.
As demonstrated by a scattering of protests in Spring 1970, students were quite capable of
mounting spontaneous protests without aid from national organizations. Always eager to
discover fresh pastures for their spies and new possibilities for political intelligence, the BCI
dispatched Special Services personnel to campuses far removed from centers of radical activism
like Buffalo and New Paltz.
In March, 20 students at Corning Community College worked in shifts to picket oncampus recruiting by IBM, a major defense contractor. The Special Services detail expressed
keen interest in the action by the local student group, which called itself the Independent Radical
Coalition. This was “the first indication of any Leftist activity at this Community [sic] college,”
an investigator later noted in his report, “and continued liaison will be maintained with the
administration and sources of information at this campus, relative to future activities, or any
acceleration of interests in this anti movement [sic].”135
On April 1, around 40 students from Herkimer County Community College led an
antiwar chant in front of their local draft board. Special Services personnel later interviewed the
Dean of Students, who said the protest was “sort of a spontaneous act,” organized by no
registered student group. Names of student activists were dutifully noted and promptly
forwarded to Division Headquarters.136
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At all-male Hobart College, the month of April saw sit-ins and a days-long occupation of
a campus building by students opposed to the presence of ROTC on campus.137
On April 30, President Nixon appeared on television to announce that U.S. troops would
soon be crossing into Cambodia. Although the mass media largely embraced his decision, it was
hard not to interpret this move as a sign of a widening war.138 Over the following days, 80
percent of the nation’s college campuses reported protests.139 Although students attacked ROTC
buildings on some campuses, most of these demonstrations ended peacefully. But on May 4 at
Kent State University, where students had also damaged an ROTC building during a night of
raucous protest, members of the Ohio National Guard opened fire on a group of students, killing
four and seriously wounding several others. A week later, members of the Mississippi Highway
Patrol unleashed a barrage of bullets at a group of unarmed Black youth on the campus of
Jackson State College, leaving two dead and twelve wounded. The Kent State and Jackson State
tragedies further rocked the nation’s campuses, as close to two million students left their classes
to protest both government repression and military violence in Indochina. Protests affected 44
percent of two-year schools, and a fifth of all types of campuses completely closed for anywhere
from one day to rest of the semester.140
The response at New York State’s colleges and universities was immediate and
widespread. After hearing the news about Kent State, SUNY-Buffalo’s students were quick to
organize. On May 6, 2,500 of them marched down Main Street. That evening, a much smaller
contingent set fire to the campus ROTC building. According to historian Kenneth Heineman,
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“City police promptly laid siege to the university,” firing tear gas into university buildings and
firing birdshot rounds indiscriminately at students walking to class.141
While few other colleges in New York State recorded levels of violent unrest on par with
Buffalo, some protests were scenes of tense face-offs with police. In Albany, thousands of
protesters shut down the state capitol while a separate action by around six hundred
demonstrators confronted the State Police as they blocked traffic on the New York State
Thruway.142 Near Rochester, State Police cordoned off the campus of SUNY-Brockport after
hundreds of students occupied the administration building.143
At the New York State Agricultural and Technical College at Farmingdale, 150 students
occupied the college’s main administration building. Bolstered by the chanting of more than 100
demonstrators outside, the occupiers demanded that the college publicly denounce both the
Cambodia invasion and the incident at Kent State. However, it seems the college president was
loath to take this step, as he soon called in a detachment of 200 Suffolk County police officers to
break up the protest. Observing the actions of the Farmingdale students were investigators
working with Suffolk County Police Department’s Intelligence Unit, who promptly furnished
names of arrested student protesters to the BCI.144
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Meanwhile, students at Syracuse University erected mounds of debris to block roads into
campus. To ensure a steady supply of volunteers who could man the blockades around the clock,
student organizers formed a Barricade Committee.145
Protests also rocked SUNY-Oneonta, where students physically blocked access to
classrooms and more than 1,000 students (or around one-third of the college’s total enrollment)
participated in a daylong boycott of classes. Also, for the first time since the war began, faculty
took a stand on the issue when it voted to publicly demand that President Nixon stop the invasion
of Cambodia and end the war in Vietnam.146 On May 6, Special Services personnel obtained
(probably from Oneonta’s police department) a parade permit application submitted by protesters
who wanted to demonstrate against the expanding war in Southeast Asia. Names appearing on
the document, including faculty from Oneonta and nearby Hartwick College, were subsequently
indexed in Special Services files.147 To their credit, neither Oneonta police nor the BCI
attempted to deny protesters the right to march. On May 9, the result was Oneonta’s largest
demonstration in years, involving more than 2,000 students, faculty, and community members.148
On May 6, the BCI supervisor at Troop A headquarters ordered an investigation of a
planned protest at Genesee Community College, located between Buffalo and Rochester. Two
investigators from the Special Services detail later observed the group of around 100 students as
they marched from their campus to the city of Batavia’s local draft board. “We wish to make it
perfectly clear,” read a flyer passed out during the demonstration, “that we are not striking
against this college, but against federal policies which do not represent the beliefs of this
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segment of the people.” Throughout the event, investigators used their radios to “provide a
continuous flow of information to Troop Headquarters regarding this demonstration, the number
of students taking part, and any other pertinent facts relating thereto.”149
Meanwhile, more than two-thirds of students at North Country Community College
(NCCC), serving the mountainous and remote Adirondack region, supported a strike action in a
campus-wide referendum. On May 11, the college hosted an all-day teach-in, where speeches by
faculty and student activists were summarized and reported back to Division Headquarters by
Special Services personnel. The same day, an informant, T-2, advised the state police
investigators that a pair of out-of-state SDS organizers had arrived in town allegedly for the
purpose of urging insurrection among students. The next day, the college president closed
campus as hundreds of NCCC students marched through the nearby town of Saranac Lake.
While organizers at the head of the march carried a coffin to signify those killed in Vietnam and
at Kent State, another informant, probably an FBI agent, surreptitiously photographed protesters.
The state police report for this event notes that this particular source had been photographing
protest leaders in the Saranac Lake area for days prior to the march. The informant later sent
these photographs to Troop B headquarters for identification purposes.150
Elsewhere, student activists reacted to Kent State and Cambodia in ways that angered
influential community members. Weeks of unrest at Ulster County Community College did not
sit well with certain members of the county legislature, responsible for allocating a large share of
the institution’s funding. To protest the U.S. invasion of Cambodia, as well as the killing of four
students at Kent State University, student activist and Marine veteran William Warner helped
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lead a student strike which shut down UCCC for half-a-day. While his organizing efforts failed
to convince the student body to extend the strike to a second day, radical faculty and students did
succeed in establishing a “Free University” on campus for the duration of the semester.
Free University classes, open to all and taught by both UCCC students and faculty who
supported the strike, tackled such topics as “Revolutionary Analysis and Modern America” and
“Poetry and the Dharma Revolution.” While the Free University at UCCC was in full swing, and
after hearing disturbing reports of flags being lowered on campus, Republican County Legislator
Lester C. Elmendorf used a visit to the county legislative board by UCCC’s president and Dean
of Administration as an opportunity to vent his frustration about student radicals. Demanding an
“explanation of what is going on out there,” Elmendorf expressed his desire to see expulsion for
the student strikers and withheld paychecks for the faculty who supported them.151
In a May 8 conference call, SUNY Chancellor Samuel Gould urged community college
presidents to be flexible in response to the demands of student protesters. In a remarkable
admission from the head of one of the country’s largest state university systems, Gould also
expressed concerns about the “possibility of a real shooting revolution” unless President Nixon
calmed the situation.152 Meanwhile, in Washington, D.C., the scale and intensity of the protests
also rattled the Nixon administration. As historians Maurice Isserman and Michael Kazin write,
Nixon “was quick to back down from the Cambodian invasion” and withdrew all American
forces from that country by the end of June.153 In his memoirs, Nixon’s National Security
Advisor, Henry Kissinger later wrote that “the fear of another round of demonstrations
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permeated all the thinking about Vietnam in the Executive Branch that summer—even that of
Nixon, who pretended to be impervious.”154 Despite State Police efforts to monitor and corral
the movement, student peace activists were having an impact.

As noted, prior to Cambodia and Kent State, the U.S. antiwar movement appeared to be in
decline. In keeping with this declension narrative, the consensus view of historians holds that
following the May 1970 protests, college students reverted to their usual apathy. Scholars have
written of the demoralizing effect of the Kent State incident, noting how afterwards “students
had more or less withdrawn into themselves and their campus lives.”155 However,
contemporaneous social science research shows that for a full year after the Kent State tragedy,
campus unrest continued. This perpetuation of protest largely escaped notice at the time as
antiwar organizing shifted to the smaller, less selective colleges which were less visible to
national media due to their larger proportions of working-class students.156 This counternarrative is borne out by the BCI files, which show how New York State’s college students
continued their protests during the 1970-1971 academic year.
In April 1971, as the War in Indochina dragged on, the SMC showed its continuing
relevance by organizing the “Spring Mobe,” a massive antiwar demonstration in Washington.
On April 15, informant T-1 advised Special Services that an SMC field organizer would visit
Orange County Community College on April 20 to try to establish an SMC chapter on campus
and to generate interest in traveling to Washington, D.C., for the demonstration. The SMC

154

Qtd. in DeBenedetti, American Ordeal, 285.
Zaroulis and Sullivan, Who Spoke Up?, 381; see also Means, 67 Shots, 215; and Michael W. Miles, “Student
Alienation in the U.S. Higher Education Industry,” Politics and Society 4, no. 3 (1974): 339.
156
See Alan Bayer and Alexander Astin, “Campus Unrest, 1970-1971: Was It Really All that Quiet?” Educational
Record (Fall 1971), 301-313.
155

62

organizer’s presence drew immediate attention from the State Police. After contacting an
investigator with the House Internal Security Subcommittee, Special Services personnel learned
that the organizer had “numerous past associations with Communist front organizations.” Even
more damning, the source added that the SMC was a “Trotskyite Communist Party
Organization” seeking to “gain control of the new Youthful Left Wing” [sic]. Informant T-1
promised to attend the campus visit and report their findings to Special Services.157
His efforts apparently paid off, as T-1 noted that OCCC had dozens of interested students
and faculty, enough to fill two charter buses. However, a $400 request for funds to hire the
buses passed the student senate twice only to be vetoed—first by the OCCC administration, later
by the Board of Trustees. Against this backdrop of State Police surveillance and administrative
meddling, a hardy group of students proceeded with their protest plans. Relying on their own
transportation, thirteen OCCC students finally managed to attend the march in Washington
where they joined a chorus of a quarter-million other voices all crying for an end to war.

B. Antiwar Veterans
During the early 1970s, opposition to the wars in Southeast Asia grew within the military and
took a variety of forms. In the army, the number of active-duty soldiers applying for
conscientious objector status surged from 829 in 1967 to 4,381 in 1971.158 Some units in
Vietnam expressed dissatisfaction by resorting to violence against their commanding officers.

157

This and the following paragraph draw from Case 238-2053-1, Oct. 11, 1971, Box 49, New York State NonCriminal Investigation Files.
158
Appy, American Reckoning, 214.

63

Nurturing all this dissent were dozens of radical newspapers published by and for those activeduty GIs and veterans who were opposed to the war.159
By 1971, veterans had become a major force in the antiwar effort, and one of the most
prominent anti-war alliances was Vietnam Veterans against the War (VVAW). At the time,
supporters of the war could easily discredit peace activists by portraying them as an unwashed
mass of unpatriotic, tambourine-banging hippies. But since military veterans, no matter their
level of service, seem to enjoy automatic credibility on issues of war and peace, VVAW
members had far more political clout and influence than other antiwar organizations.
The VVAW’s legitimacy was also owed to their strategic use of patriotic symbols and
Revolutionary War iconography. As historian Christian Appy has noted, these dissidents
founded their opposition to the Vietnam War on “loyalty to the nation’s founding principles.”160
Thus, in early 1971, the VVAW harkened back to the Revolutionary War era when their
members convened what they called the Winter Soldier hearings in Detroit to testify to war
crimes they claimed to have committed in Vietnam. “The summer soldier and the sunshine
patriot will, in this crisis,” Paine had written, “shrink from the service of their country.” After
Paine’s pamphlet, of course, was the brutal winter at Valley Forge when General George
Washington’s soldiers deserted en masse. Winter soldiers, therefore, were the loyal patriots who
would remain true to their calling even during times of crisis.161 By calling their event Winter
Soldier, the VVAW was thus drawing on patriotic symbols that would have been easily
recognizable to most Americans in the early 1970s.
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That the VVAW identified with the Revolutionary spirit of Thomas Paine is further
illustrated by the group’s repeated choice of locales for their demonstrations—like the Lincoln
Memorial, the Betsy Ross House, and the Lexington Battle Green—that were symbolically
loaded with American patriotism. Perhaps because of the group’s appropriation of such
symbols, all levels of law enforcement targeted the VVAW. The FBI closely monitored the
group between 1971 and 1972, when future U.S. Senator and Secretary of State, John Kerry,
served on its executive committee.162 Local police antiradical units in Los Angeles and Nassau
County, New York, also kept close tabs on the group’s activities.163
Meanwhile, as veterans in New York State proved receptive to the VVAW message and
began to organize on their own campuses, the State Police followed their every move.
Motivating the BCI’s interest in the group was the belief—held by some, but by no means all of
their countersubversive investigators—that the VVAW group was a “Communist Front” that was
“geared to destroy [the] United States’ image.”164
On April 20, 1971, a dean at UCCC advised State Police investigators that the leader of
the campus VVAW chapter and two other UCCC students planned to hold an antiwar rally the
next day. Prior to their action, a BCI investigator observed flyers posted around campus urging
students to show up and demonstrate that they “no longer believe in Mr. Nixon’s lies.” On the
day of the event, an investigator took long-distance photos of the three students as they set up a
speakers’ platform in front of the college library. Although the protest was a flop—organizers
began breaking down the speakers’ platform and sound equipment early due to lack of student
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interest—from the State Police perspective it was well worthwhile. The BCI’s report noted that
an agent from “the Federal Investigating Agency of known reliability” later met with the dean
and had him examine the BCI’s surveillance photos. This meeting with UCCC college
administration produced short biographical profiles of the three student organizers, providing
their addresses, dates of birth, Social Security numbers, and educational and military
backgrounds to state police investigators. Special Services personnel and their counterparts at
the FBI maintained contact with the UCCC dean throughout the year, noting that by the fall the
campus VVAW boasted a membership of 50 students.165
On April 23, in one of the antiwar movement’s most iconic moments, hundreds of
Vietnam veterans traveled to Washington, D.C. and hurled their combat medals onto the steps of
the capitol building.166 Weeks later, veterans affiliated with Rockland Community College drew
on the symbolic power of that protest. On May 5, following a campus teach-in aimed at raising
awareness of the continuing carnage in Vietnam and commemorating the anniversary of Kent
State, protestors traveled by motorcade to the neighboring town of Spring Valley. Following the
protest was a plainclothes BCI investigator who collected flyers and took notes.167
After marching and distributing literature in Spring Valley, more than 250 demonstrators
arrived at the town’s draft board offices. As a group of eight Vietnam veterans led the
procession by carrying an empty casket to represent area youth killed in the war, a uniformed
trooper sat in his patrol car taking surveillance photographs. In a dramatic gesture, after placing
the coffin in front of the entrance to the draft board, the veterans tossed their combat medals atop
the tomb. This was apparently too much for members of the Spring Valley Police Department,
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who swooped in and arrested twelve protesters for blocking entry to a public building. The local
police department proved happy to help the BCI in other ways, logging license plate numbers of
protesters’ cars and sharing their vehicle registration information to help Special Services open
new intelligence files on protesters. A BCI investigator later noted that he kept the FBI apprised
of the day’s activities, and later submitted his report—including photographs—to Troop F and
Division Headquarters.

C. May 1972 and the Renewal of Antiwar Dissent
By 1972, the Nixon administration’s strategy paired a gradual withdrawal of U.S. ground forces
with an enormous increase in bombing. This process of Vietnamization, together with the draft
lottery and a constricting job market for college graduates, all combined to make antiwar protest
seem less urgent to college youth. In February, when a Vassar student organized a February
peace vigil in Poughkeepsie, Special Services personnel monitoring the event reported that
attendance remained in the single digits.168 Turnout was anemic, as well, at SUNY-Cortland,
where the BCI reported that “all anti-war demonstrations during the current academic year have
been poorly attended.”169 This apparent lack of interest among New York State’s students
mirrored the national mood. With SDS in disarray, there were fewer big organizations to
channel students’ discontent. Between 1969 and 1972, groups like Clergy and Laity Concerned
about Vietnam, Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, and SANE all
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experienced membership loss between ten and twenty-five percent.170 Prior to May, the nation’s
campuses had seen months of relative peace.171
This all changed when the Nixon administration resumed B-52 strikes against Hanoi and
Haiphong—the first publicly acknowledged attacks against those cities in years—and began the
mining of ports in North Vietnam. Prompting this escalation had been the fall of the
Northeastern Province of Quang Tri and Nixon’s desire to influence negotiations with North
Vietnam (which were by then at an impasse.)172 In response to the Nixon administration’s
aggressive moves, there was a renewed wave of nationwide protests in May 1972.173
In early May, a group calling itself the Cortland Conspiracy for Change held a three-day
series of antiwar workshops. On May 4, a few dozen protesters marched from the state college
campus to the downtown Cortland offices of the Selective Service and armed forces recruiters.174
At Vassar, 300 students held a spontaneous demonstration while the college administration
postponed final exams so students could travel to protests in Washington.175
Meanwhile, at SUNY-New Paltz, students’ response to the escalation in North Vietnam
was swift and spontaneous. Around midnight on the evening of May 8, the college’s assistant
director of housing placed a frantic call to campus security, reporting that students were walking
from dorm to dorm, pulling fire alarms to create awareness of the escalation in Vietnam.
Campus security learned through its informants that around five or six different groups were

170

DeBenedetti, American Ordeal, 320, 380.
Zaroulis and Sullivan, Who Spoke Up?, 380.
172
See Jeffrey Kimball, Nixon's Vietnam War (Lawrence, KS: Univ. Press of Kansas, 1998.)
173
Zaroulis and Sullivan, Who Spoke Up? 385 ff. The response varied among different types of campuses. In New
York State, students at commuter schools like OCCC and Catholic-affiliated institutions like Marist reportedly
greeted news of the escalation with a collective shrug. George Basler, “Students Stage Protests at New Paltz and
Vassar,” Newburgh Evening News, May 10, 1972, attached to Case 238-2669-1, Mar. 28, 1973, Box 53, New York
State Non-Criminal Investigation Files.
174
Case 238-2708-1, Jun. 19, 1972, Box 48, New York State Non-Criminal Investigation Files.
175
George Basler, “Students Stage Protests at New Paltz and Vassar,” Newburgh Evening News, May 10, 1972,
attached to Case 238-2669-1, Mar. 28, 1973, Box 53, New York State Non-Criminal Investigation Files.
171

68

actively working throughout the night to organize a response to President Nixon’s handling of
the war.176
As fire alarms continued going off throughout the early morning hours, an unidentified
professor allowed students to gain access to the administration building, where they quickly
began placing furniture in stairwells to deny access to upper levels. Students closed and locked
the outer doors to the building, placing Epoxy cement in keyholes to prevent anyone from
entering. With disorder spreading rapidly across campus, students broke into the college print
shop and removed mimeograph machines and typewriters. By the time State Police arrived later
that morning, students had already used the pilfered equipment to produce an “Information
Bulletin” and a flyer entitled “Where Will Escalation Stop?”
The next day, a public relations official at the college told the BCI that while the campus
situation had calmed, there were now hundreds of students marching on Rt. 32 towards the
Village of New Paltz. By 11 a.m., 500 students were blocking traffic at a major intersection in
the Village. With traffic at a stand-still, students passed out leaflets to puzzled motorists as BCI
investigator on the scene snapped photos, collected flyers, and identified protesters.
Back on campus, activists attended an afternoon rally on the campus quad where plans
were discussed to block the Thruway. This information moved quickly back to the BCI, by way
of its trusty student informant, FS-1. Special Services personnel in turn phoned the supervisor of
Troop T, responsible for policing the state highway system. By 3:15, as dozens of students piled
into their cars and left campus for the nearest Thruway exit, hoping that their action would force
motorists to stop and think of what their country was doing in Vietnam. As a flyer passed
around at the afternoon rally explained: “We will drive [illegible] the NY Thruway and slow cars
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to an eventual halt in a blockade. Thus stopped, we will explain to all blockaded traffic and any
media the necessity of this war-related inconvenience.” Another flyer instructed motorists:
“Think, reflect as you sit in your cars about the situation of the world, about the situation of our
country. Understand, please, that this reflecting pause is necessary—for things can hardly
continue as they are now.” But their ability to follow through on this plan was compromised
from the start by the BCI’s student informant.
State troopers met the student motorcade at the interchange but let them onto the thruway
after receiving assurances they would not attempt to block traffic. In the end, New Paltz’s
Thruway action involved as many as 125 students in eighteen cars holding up traffic for twentyfive minutes. Thruway authority snowplows later came in to move students’ cars out of the way
after protestors refused to move. As one news report later put it, “Some students later said that
the blockade failed to tie up traffic as planned because police had been tipped off beforehand.”
Still, the number of students involved, and their militancy, marked a radical departure from
lackluster antiwar efforts at the New Paltz campus earlier in the semester.177
New Paltz students were not alone. Over the next several days, President Nixon’s
decision to escalate in North Vietnam triggered a wave of protests up and down the Hudson
Valley. On May 10, around 600 SUNY-New Paltz students attended a 9 a.m. meeting to plan the
day’s major peace action: A walk from campus to the IBM headquarters in Poughkeepsie that
was expected to draw scores of area students. Later known for developing some of the earliest
personal computers, during the Vietnam War the Poughkeepsie-based technology firm had a
Pentagon contract to assist in target selection for bombing runs. In accordance with the Nixon
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administration’s Vietnamization scheme, IBM’s role became more prominent as the war became
increasingly fought through the air. Students kept this connection front and center during their
march, indicting what was then the nation’s fifth-largest corporation for its role in the war. “The
automated air war which is killing 300 Indochinese a day,” read one of their flyers, “would have
a hard time continuing without IBM’s complicity.”178
Later that morning, as 150 students proceeded to Poughkeepsie, Special Services and
uniform personnel wrote down license plate numbers for vehicles involved in the line of march.
By 2 p.m., after Vassar students had joined the procession, as many as 300 marchers advanced
along Route 9W to the Oakwood School, a Quaker institution where students would meet with
the IBM plant’s general manager and an IBM attorney. Leading this piece of the protest was 22year-old Michael Stamm, a Quaker peace activist whose parents were teachers at Oakwood.
According to one press account, Stamm had attended “more antiwar protests there and elsewhere
than he can recall” and in the process been arrested “more times than most members of the
mafia.” As Stamm and other organizers urged these officials to end their collaboration with the
war, IBM representatives warned that any acts of civil disobedience would result in arrest.
At 4 p.m., students massed near IBM parking lot property in Poughkeepsie. As they held
a banner reading “End the Computer Complicity,” some demonstrators upped the ante by
trespassing in an act of nonviolent protest. When twelve refuse to move from IBM parking lot
property, they were promptly arrested by Poughkeepsie police.
Later that evening, New Paltz was again the site of protest when around 20 students
locked themselves in the Humanities Building; demonstrators ended their sit-in only after the
Dean of Students entered through a window to discuss their concerns.

178

This and the following four paragraphs draw on flyers, clippings and surveillance reports attached to Case 2382669-1, Mar. 28, 1973, Box 53, New York State Non-Criminal Investigation Files.

71

Two days later, on May 12, Special Services personnel phoned an official at the Air
Force’s Office of Special Investigations to inform them of an upcoming demonstration at
Kingston Recruiting Station and Kingston Draft Board. As around 50 students walked 12 miles
from the UCCC campus, another group of Bard and New Paltz students began their march from
a local center of antiwar activity: Kingston’s Trinity United Methodist Church. The two groups
converged at Academy Green in the center of Kingston, where they marched in a loop around the
Green, the draft board offices and recruiting station. All in all, it was an impressive display of
unity and purpose by the Hudson Valley’s student peace movement which only months before
had seemed to be drained of energy.
Throughout 1972, the war in Vietnam was increasingly fought through the air. In June
alone, U.S. forces dropped more than 100,000 tons of bombs on targets in North and South
Vietnam.179 In October, there appeared to be a breakthrough in the Paris Peace talks when the
U.S. finally agreed to allow North Vietnamese troops to remain in the South. However,
following Nixon’s reelection in November, U.S. diplomats brought to the bargaining table a set
of much harsher terms. When North Vietnam balked, the Nixon administration seized on this
opportunity to present military force as the only logical response to communist obstinacy.180
Nixon boasted beforehand that U.S. military maneuvers would be “massive and brutal in
character,” and what became known as the “Christmas bombing” lived up to its hype. Over a
period of twelve days, between December 18 and December 29, B-52s dropped 15,000 tons of
bombs on targets in Hanoi and Haiphong. 181 As Kissinger’s biographer later wrote, when the
U.S. eventually signed the peace agreement, “The modifications for which these lives were lost
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were so minor that neither Nixon nor Kissinger would adequately remember what they were.”182
Thus, the most extensive bombing campaign since World War II killed thousands of civilians but
did little to extract substantive concessions from North Vietnam.
Conveniently for the Nixon administration, the carnage came at a time when college
campuses were closed for the holidays. However, while the bombs were still falling in North
Vietnam, students and community members joined a three day “Christmas Peace Pilgrimage”
from Poughkeepsie to West Point to protest the continuing war in Vietnam and IBM’s role in the
bombing campaign. In January 1973, Auburn Community College students returning from
winter break convened an all-night peace vigil in front of their city’s federal building.
Approximately 50 of these protesters braved the freezing temperatures to “bring pressure on
Congress to stop all appropriations for further military action in Indo-China.” Two of the bravest
stayed overnight into the morning. A BCI investigator also braved the cold to identify the
organizers, providing their names and other information in a report to Division Headquarters.183

With the signing of the Paris Peace accords, on January 27, the Vietnam War had ceased to be an
American conflict.184 Although U.S. forces remained two more years before a North Vietnamese
invasion pushed American personnel out of Saigon, during that time peace activists drifted away
in droves. In 1973, the Student Mobilization Committee operated on a bare-bones organizational
structure while membership of movement standard-bearers SANE and CALC dropped by half.185
On March 26, in one of the last gasps of the once-strong New Paltz movement, a campus
informant kept Special Services apprised of a sit-in involving around a dozen students outside a
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Marine recruiting table in the college’s administration building. Later that fall, Special Services
maintained regular contact with its student informants at SUNY-New Paltz to keep tabs on the
waning antiwar effort.
At the close of 1973, Special Services was in its ninth year of monitoring the student
peace movement. At an increasing rate through the 1960s and into the 1970s, their agents
carefully compiled lists of names and license plate numbers, created dossiers on individual
activists, indexed this information and made it all available to members of the NYSP’s
intelligence network. Although it remains hard to tell how often it occurred, the NYSP spy files
make clear that the contents of their intelligence reports were sometimes passed on to academic
authorities, employers, other law enforcement agencies—anyone who might have an interest in
prosecuting, further investigating or punishing the subjects of surveillance.
Much of this activity was perfectly unconstitutional, of course. The secrecy surrounding
the Special Services detail, and the effort made to maintain it by top officials at the NYSP,
suggests that there was at least some knowledge that they were operating on shaky legal ground.
By 1971, there had been at least eighteen lawsuits challenging the political intelligence practices
of police agencies across the country.186 But the New York State Police escaped such scrutiny in
part by striking a implicit bargain with college administrators: Allow our spies on campus, keep
silent about our activities, and we will help ensure peace on campus.187 Support from academia,
combined with lack of any meaningful legislative oversight, allowed the NYSP to continue its
spying operation well into the mid-1970s. In 1974 alone, the BCI opened more than 7,000 new
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non-criminal investigations—the highest tally ever recorded.188 Although no one could have
predicted it at the time, the agency’s political intelligence work was about to come to an abrupt
end.

188

58th Annual Report of the New York State Police 1975, 18, New York State Library, Albany, NY.

75

CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSION: THE LEGACY OF “POLICE STATE TACTICS”
In November 1975, the wall of secrecy surrounding State Police spying finally came tumbling
down. Press accounts called it “the biggest civil-liberties scandal in New York’s history.” And
it started with a hunch one month earlier, when Bill Haddad—then director of Assembly Office
of Legislative Oversight—asked the NYSP if they ever kept files on people not suspected or
convicted of criminal activity. State Police officials invited him to Division Headquarters in
Albany, where he was led to a 50-yard-long room lined with filing cabinets containing all the
intelligence on student peace activists and other subversives. When Haddad decided to test the
system, checking entries on famous progressive names or organizations—the ACLU,
Congressman Shirley Chisholm, the NAACP—he found thick files whose contents left him
shaken and disturbed. After Haddad sent a brief report to his boss, the Assembly Speaker,
someone “leaked” the report to Newsday, one of the state’s largest daily newspapers, which
published a sensational cover story headlined “‘Political Dossiers’ Kept by State Cops.” In the
months to come, the newspaper published more than a dozen follow-up stories on the NYSP’s
spying operation.
All that the State Police had tried so hard to obscure over the years—the use of
informants, its massive file collection, and the apparent targeting of anyone who held unpopular
(usually leftwing) political opinions—had finally become public knowledge. Most damning of
all was a Newsday report on the transcript of a phone conversation where State Police officials
discussed purging evidence to prevent disclosure of the BCI’s informant network among college
officials. In response, a SUNY spokesman made this patently false statement: “We do not know
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of any official or campus that has turned over information on student activists to State Police.”189
But SUNY was not the only agency trying to manage the public relations fallout. The new State
Police Superintendent also claimed that Special Services spying operations had been disbanded
early in 1975, and that civil libertarians had nothing to worry about because NYSP intelligence
files only contained news clippings.
But official denials became less plausible as revelations continued to mount and
prominent critics joined the fray. After learning that Special Services had kept a file on him,
former U.S. Attorney General Ramsey Clark was circumspect. “Already battered by Watergate
and a massive assault on privacy by public and private institutions and dynamics,” he ruefully
observed, “we are inclined to react with a sense of déjà vu.” In an op-ed, Clark noted that the
upcoming bicentennial should be an opportunity for Americans to reflect on the meaning of
democracy and to turn away from “police state tactics.”190
Within weeks of the exposé, Haddad’s preliminary report on State Police spying reached
the office of Governor Hugh Carey, who promptly set in motion the creation of a special
legislative task force to investigate the BCI’s intelligence-gathering operation. Critics were
quick to question their modus operandi, particularly the task force’s failure to subpoena
witnesses and the fact that its members had the opportunity to analyze only a small sample of
Special Services files.191 The overall tone of the ensuing report, published in the fall of 1977,
was conciliatory, giving the NYSP the benefit of the doubt when it observed that Special
Services engaged in “questionable methods” but showed “no pattern of illegal acts.”192
Similarly, the task force sought to go easy on the State Police while acknowledging the harm
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done to civil liberties. Although its members claimed to have found “no policy or systematic
attempts to stifle free speech,” they recognized that “the system of intelligence-gathering that
existed could have caused repression of free speech.”193 Even this critique was not as powerful
as it could have been because task force members were not able to interview the subjects of
surveillance.
In hindsight, the State Assembly’s task force would have done well to talk with someone
like Jonathan Garlock whose political organizing activities resulted in years of State Police
surveillance. Between 1966 and the early 1970s, the NYSP’s countersubversive unit focused
special attention on Garlock, who moved to the Hudson Valley in 1965 from Berkeley,
California. While receiving a graduate degree in English from the University of California’s
flagship, he helped organize a graduate students’ union and was arrested during the Free Speech
Movement’s sit-ins on campus. During a brief stint as an instructor at SUNY-New Paltz, his
radical credentials endeared him to the campus left, helping him become one of the area’s most
prominent activists, “a constant agitator at New Paltz” (in the words of one Special Services
report) and the focus of numerous investigative reports by Special Services.194
In an oral history interview, Garlock remarked on the general climate of repression
during the Vietnam era. “Back in those days, anyone on the left assumed that their phones were
being tapped,” he said. While there is no evidence the BCI tapped Garlock’s phone, they did
employ intrusive methods to gather intelligence. Starting in October 1968, the BCI used an
“unofficial” (read: illegal) mail cover at his home for the purposes of “identifying associates.”
As a result of the mail cover, which continued through much of the next year, the BCI started
intelligence files on anyone receiving and sending mail to Garlock’s address.
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Working as regional organizer for SDS and other New Left organizations in the Hudson
Valley, Garlock spent a lot of time driving from meeting to meeting. Regardless of whether he
was navigating busy highways or dusty country roads, he often saw a familiar sight in the rearview mirror of his green Volkswagen minibus: “You had to drive pretty carefully because you
were always being tailed by the State Police or the county sheriff.” On November 8, 1968, the
Special Services detail followed Garlock for miles as he picked up area youths en route to a
regional SDS conference at the University of Rochester. When Special Services lost track of
Garlock’s vehicle amidst traffic congestion, investigators drove back to the Village of New Paltz
and searched in vain for more than an hour before returning dejected to Troop Headquarters.195
Garlock was a seasoned activist who years later seemed philosophical about the routine
harassment, even taking in stride his 1966 arrest by State Police on a trumped-up hit-and-run
charge. But what was the effect of surveillance on students and those newer to political
organizing? Without conducting oral history interviews it would be difficult to gauge the extent
to which State Police spying chilled free speech on campus. However, one scene from the State
Police spy files does suggest that students were unnerved by campus surveillance. In February
1966, when Garlock was still an instructor at New Paltz, he was involved in a free speech fight
on campus. A new leftwing student organization, the Student Action Movement, was demanding
access to college facilities equal to that enjoyed by other groups. Their struggle was
multidimensional—SAM protests sometimes morphed into antiwar rallies and vice versa—and at
a particularly large demonstration, on February 22, 1966, the BCI dispatched no fewer than three
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undercover informants along with at least seven plainclothes BCI agents, including a pair of
Special Services photographers.196
The overt surveillance of that rally was clearly still on students’ minds the next month,
when a SAM meeting in the Student Union provided an opportunity for the group’s chairman to
calm frayed nerves. According to a BCI informant who was there to take notes for Special
Services, the SAM leader told students “not to be concerned about being photographed” because
their pictures were likely already in the files of the FBI. According to this student protest leader,
there were “innumerable FBI agents on the campus.” Not only did Hoover’s agency have people
in the SUNY-New Paltz administration working as paid informants, the SAM chairman said, but
he even knew their names. Finally, the chairman claimed that the FBI knew that SAM was
“peace-loving and anti-war” and was simply “trying to harass the members.” As this example
shows, students were concerned enough about spying on campus that the leader of their
organization took the time to address the topic in a speech. However, it is noteworthy that these
students assumed that any plainclothes officers on campus with cameras had to be from the FBI.
It was simply unthinkable to them that the State Police had the resources and manpower to carry
out a spying operation of this magnitude.

Like those students at SUNY-New Paltz, historians often assume that spying and other forms of
repression in the Vietnam era were strictly the province of the FBI. By offering the first-ever
examination of the extent of state police spying on the antiwar movement, this thesis has
proposed to include stories and experiences too long absent from the record of political
repression in the postwar United States. During the Vietnam War, the NYSP went outside its
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traditional law enforcement role to target individuals and organizations solely on the basis of
political beliefs and activities. During the years when Governor Rockefeller was in office, the
State Police doubled in size and increased the scope of its political intelligence gathering
operations to include the student peace movement. Although composed mostly of nonviolent
protesters, campus peace activists in the state were photographed and surveilled, their identities
and affiliations shared widely with other law enforcement agencies—all because of baseless
claims that equated antiwar activity with Communist subversion.
Another contribution that this thesis makes is to demonstrate that antiwar organizing
emerged at working-class colleges much earlier and lasted longer than historians had previously
assumed. Scholars have long believed that 1969 marked the year when the antiwar movement
expanded onto less-selective, working-class campuses. But anti-recruiting and antidraft protests
roiled schools like Dutchess Community College as early as fall 1967; the following spring,
several two-year schools in the state participated in the SMC’s International Student Strike. And
contrary to the claims of some historians that there were no major antiwar demonstrations in the
U.S. after 1971, some of the most militant protests at SUNY-New Paltz did not occur until May
1972.197
Finally, this study has provided the first-ever account of the anti-Vietnam War movement
at community colleges. In New York State, community college students’ protests were often
spontaneous affairs emanating from groups that often had no known organizational affiliation.
These ad hoc committees organized protests or teach-ins and melted away after a while, finding
it difficult to sustain any enduring presence among a largely transient, working-class student
body. At times, the ideology and appeal of national student organizations like SDS did find
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fertile ground at two-year campuses. However, as the example of OCCC shows, scrutiny from
student government, local media outlets, and the NYSP Special Services branch limited what
student protesters could achieve. Community colleges’ strength—their roots in a local, often
rural or suburban community—was also their weakness as it created more opportunities for
agents of repression to stifle New Left activities. Moreover, as seen in the case of UCCC during
the May 1970 student strike, the unique funding arrangement of SUNY’s community colleges
allowed county legislators to apply pressure on college administrators.
Future research could benefit by incorporating oral histories into this narrative to add
texture to what historians know about the impact of political repression on individuals’ lives.
The most obvious methodological problem of the present study is the extreme subjectivity of
police surveillance reports. However, whether they treat the act of surveillance itself as a topic
or simply utilize these reports to compensate for a dearth of other documentation, historians have
consistently recognized the importance of such materials to the study of radical movements.
The full astonishing extent of the NYSP’s spying operation suggests that historians ought
to pay closer attention to the kinds of political intelligence gathered during the 1960s and 1970s
by local, county and state law enforcement agencies. The historical narrative’s persistent focus
on the FBI offers a comforting illusion that repression of the New Left was strictly a federal
affair or the product of J. Edgar Hoover’s obsessive anti-Communist crusade. As this thesis has
suggested, historical studies of political repression might find in state and local law enforcement
a more fruitful unit of analysis. The overarching aim of this thesis has been to encourage the use
of police spy files in future studies of social movements in postwar United States. Not to do so
would be to exclude an entire dimension of state power from the historical narrative.
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APPENDIX
AGENCIES EXCHANGING POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE WITH
NYSP BUREAU OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION, SPECIAL SERVICES
California
Los Angeles Police Dept.

Connecticut
Connecticut State Police

District of Columbia
Metropolitan Police Dept.

Florida
Metro Dade County Police Dept.

Maryland
Maryland State Police

Michigan
Detroit Police Dept.
Michigan State Police

Ohio
Ohio State Highway Patrol

New Jersey
New Jersey State Police
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New York State
Albany Police Dept.
Binghamton Police Dept.
Buffalo Police Dept.
Ellenville Police Dept.
Kingston Police Dept.
Middletown Police Dept.
Nassau County Police Dept.
New York City Police Dept.
Oneonta Police Dept.
Rochester Police Dept.
Rome Police Dept.
Suffolk County Police Dept.
Syracuse Police Dept.
Troy Police Dept.
Utica Police Dept.
Yonkers Police Dept.

Other
Federal Bureau of Investigation
108th Military Intelligence Group, Army Intelligence
U.S. Army Intelligence Unit, Stewart Field, Newburgh, New York
Office of Special Investigations, United States Air Force
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